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The appropriate standard for supervisory liability in Section 1983
cases has been a source of considerable disagreement among federal
courts of appeals. In the absence of established Supreme Court author-
ity on the subject, courts have rejected vicarious and negligence liability
in favor of a higher culpability requirement, but they have not agreed
on precisely what form this higher standard should take. In this article,
Professor Kinports addresses the need for a uniform standard consis-
tent with the statute's twin goals of compensating the victims of constitu-
tional violations and deterring constitutional infractions.
Professor Kinports notes at the outset that lower courts have unjus-
tifiably relied on Supreme Court opinions discussing state-of-mind re-
quirements for particular constitutional violations and cases addressing
municipal liability in Section 1983 suits in formulating the requirements
for supervisory liability. She then identifies five factors considered by
courts in determining whether supervisory liability should be imposed
on the facts of particular cases: (1) the existence of prior similar inci-
dents; (2) the supervisor's response to such incidents; (3) the supervi-
sor's response to the specific incident involved in the suit; (4) the extent
to which the supervisor caused the violation; and (5) the supervisor's
awareness of the constitutional wrongdoing. Application of these fac-
tors has led to inconsistent results in similar cases, the author argues.
She further contends that courts in general have too readily ruled in
favor of supervisory officials.
As a substantive matter, Professor Kinports asserts, the standard of
supervisory liability should be a national one. In addition, the author
advocates a meaningful standard of culpability, which she concludes is
best satisfied by a negligence standard. Liability for supervisory negli-
gence is consistent with Supreme Court precedent as well as Section
1983's causation requirement, and concerns about protecting blameless
supervisors are already assuaged by the qualified immunity defense
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available to executive branch officials, which the author suggests should
shield supervisors if a reasonable public official in their position would
not have realized that the actions taken by their subordinates violated
the Constitution. Professor Kinports thus concludes that it makes sense
to hold supervisory officials accountable for constitutional violations
caused by their negligence in supervising, training, or disciplining their
subordinates.
In March of 1991, the nation watched in horror as the videotape
depicting the brutal beating of Rodney King, an African American
man, at the hands of more than a dozen white Los Angeles police
officers played over and over on television screens across the country.'
A year later, the country was likewise shocked when a California jury
refused to convict the only four police officers charged in connection
with the beating.2 The riots that accompanied those verdicts3 and the
subsequent conviction of two of the officers on federal charges4 also
1. In the early morning hours of March 3, 1991, police officers observed King's car driving
at an excessive rate of speed. The police apprehended King following a high-speed chase, and
then repeatedly kicked and beat him as he lay on the ground. A bystander happened to video-
tape the beating. See Seth Mydans et al., Seven Minutes in Los Angeles-A Special Report, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at Al; Hector Tobar & Leslie Berger, Tape of L.A. Police Beating Suspect
Stirs Public Furor, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1991, at Al.
As a result of the beating, King's skull was fractured in a number of places, his eye socket
and cheekbone were shattered, one of his legs was broken, he suffered a concussion, and his face
was partially paralyzed. See Mydans et al., supra, at Al.
King testified that he heard the officers chanting racial epithets during the beating. See
John L. Mitchell & Shawn Hubler, King Gets Award of $3.8 Million, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1994,
at Al. Although the police denied that charge, police department transcripts indicated that ra-
cial slurs about another incident were transmitted shortly before the assault on King from the car
assigned to two of the police officers charged in connection with King's beating. See Tracy Wood
& Sheryl Stolberg, Patrol Car Log in Beating Released, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1991, at Al.
2. The four officers were Sergeant Stacey Koon, the officer in charge at the scene, who
ordered the beating and fired an electric taser stun gun at King; Officer Laurence Powell, who
delivered most of the blows; Officer Timothy Wind, who kicked King and struck him with a
baton; and Officer Theodore Briseno, who stomped on King's face and neck. See John Hurst &
Leslie Berger, Crisis in the LAPD, L.A. TIms, Feb. 3, 1992, at B1; Mydans et al., supra note 1,
at Al.
Each of the four defendants was acquitted on the charge of assault with a deadly weapon.
The jury deadlocked on the question whether Powell was guilty of excessive use of force by a
police officer, but acquitted the other three defendants of that charge. See Richard A. Serrano
& Tracy Wilkinson, All 4 in King Beating Acquitted, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al.
3. The acquittal of the four officers led to "the worst urban riots in a century." Mitchell &
Hubler, supra note 1, at Al. During the riots, more than 40 people were killed, more than 2,000
were injured, and almost one billion dollars worth of property was destroyed. See Koon v.
United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2041-42 (1996).
4. All four officers were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994), the criminal counterpart to
the civil cause of action provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 242 makes it a federal
crime for a state official to willfully deprive another of her constitutional rights. Koon and Pow-
ell were convicted on this charge, but the other two officers were acquitted. See Jim Newton, 2
Officers Guilty, 2 Acquitted, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, at Al.
Although Koon and Powell each faced a maximum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment and
a $250,000 fine, see id., and the federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence in the range
of 70 to 87 months for the crime, see United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 785 (C.D. Cal.
1993), the two officers were sentenced to 30 months in prison. On appeal, their convictions were
affirmed, but the court remanded for resentencing because, in its view, the district judge had
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received a great deal of media scrutiny. Comparatively little attention
was paid, however, to the civil suit that Rodney King filed under Sec-
tion 19835 against the City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles Police Chief
Darryl Gates, and fourteen other police officers. And almost no one
noticed when the federal district court dismissed the portion of the
Section 1983 case involving Police Chief Gates.6
In the context of the civil suit, the City of Los Angeles conceded
that King's constitutional rights had been violated. After a trial lim-
ited to the issue of damages, a federal jury ordered the city to pay
King $3.8 million in compensatory damages.7 During the punitive
damages phase of the trial, which focused on the culpability of the
individual defendants,8 Federal District Court Judge John G. Davies
dismissed Gates from the suit after hearing King's evidence.9 The
judge concluded that King had failed to prove that Gates "'acted mali-
ciously or out of spite or was callously indifferent to the rights and
safety of others.... Bad management is not enough.... Allowing
racism is not enough. Poor supervision is not enough,"' the judge
noted. 10
erred in departing downward from the sentencing guidelines. See United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d
1416 (9th Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court disagreed with much of the court of appeals' reasoning
on the sentencing question, and the case has now been remanded back to the trial court.
See Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2048-54.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). This statute creates a civil cause of action in federal court
against "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." Id.
6. See John L. Mitchell, Judge Drops Gates from King Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1994,
at Al.
7. See Mitchell & Hubler, supra note 1, at Al.
8. See id. Punitive damages may not be assessed against a municipality in a Section 1983
case, see City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), but may be awarded against
an individual defendant who acted recklessly or with callous indifference to the plaintiff's rights.
See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
9. The jury eventually denied King's request for punitive damages altogether, concluding
that Koon and Powell had acted with malice but had already been punished sufficiently for their
misconduct and that the other officers had not violated King's constitutional rights. See John L.
Mitchell, Punitive Damages from Police in King Beating Rejected, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1994, at
Al.
10. Mitchell, supra note 6, at Al (quoting district court). But cf. INDEPENDENT COMM. ON
TmE Los ANGELES POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los AN-
GELES POUCE DEPARTMENT at iii, iv (1991) (Christopher Commission report) (report issued by
commission created in the wake of the King beating found "a significant number" of Los Ange-
les police officers "who repetitively use excessive force against the public and persistently ignore
the written guidelines of the Department regarding force" and concluded that the police depart-
ment's "failure to analyze and act upon these revealing data evidences a significant breakdown
in the management and leadership of the Department"); Mark Curriden, When Good Cops Go
Bad, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at 62, 64-65 (noting that Los Angeles is "the king of the payouts" in
police brutality suits and that its police department is currently being investigated by the Justice
Department for engaging in a pattern of civil rights violations); Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies,
and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban
America, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1455, 1471-82 (1993) (arguing that the beating of Rodney King was
part of a pattern of abuse by Los Angeles police officers, directed in particular against young
African American and Latino men, and that the police department tolerated that abuse); Seth
Mydans, Era in Los Angeles Ends as Chief Quits, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1992, at A6 (describing
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Judge Davies's decision is not particularly unusual. Although the
federal courts have failed to adopt a consistent standard of liability for
supervisors in Section 1983 cases, they have been fairly consistent in
allowing supervisors to escape liability for their subordinates' consti-
tutional wrongs. These cases are the focus of this article.
The federal courts have uniformly acknowledged that Section
1983-by imposing liability on any state official who "subjects" the
plaintiff to a deprivation of constitutional rights or "causes [her] to be
subjected" to such a deprivation'1'-envisions that supervisory offi-
cials can be held liable for their subordinates' constitutional misdeeds
in cases where they did not actively participate in, or even witness, the
constitutional violation. But the courts have not agreed on the precise
legal standard that ought to apply in such circumstances.
As in many areas of Section 1983 jurisprudence, neither the brief
text of the statute nor the legislative history provides definitive gui-
dance on the question of supervisory liability. The terms "cause" and
"subject" that appear in the statute suggest that some level of culpa-
bility is required for any defendant, including a supervisor, and the
Supreme Court has endorsed that conclusion. Beyond that, however,
the courts must necessarily balance the need to provide a meaningful
remedy to those whose rights have been infringed and a meaningful
deterrent to future violations against the competing concerns that the
federal judiciary not unduly inhibit public officials in the performance
of their duties or otherwise impermissibly extend federal jurisdiction
into areas best left for resolution on the state and local level.
The latter concerns have played a major role in the evolution of
the qualified immunity defense that individual defendants, including
supervisors, may assert in Section 1983 suits. Thus, the policy or pru-
dential concerns that may be driving the courts to reject Section 1983
claims against supervisors are already addressed by this broad and oft-
invoked affirmative defense, which immunizes defendants in any case
where the constitutional rights asserted by the plaintiff are not clearly
established. The countervailing remedial and deterrent considera-
tions, coupled with the statute's text, suggest that courts should im-
pose liability on supervisors so long as they were personally
culpable-that is, at least negligent-and so long as their negligence
caused the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. Under this standard, if
Rodney King could prove that Darryl Gates had been a bad manager,
report issued by Amnesty International, which found "a pattern of excessive force and racial
bias" in the Los Angeles Police Department that the organization labeled a "human rights
scandal").
Although Gates was absolved from liability in the Section 1983 suit, King's beating and the
Christopher Commission's negative report ultimately forced Gates to retire in June of 1992. See
John L. Mitchell, Gates Says He Was a Model for LAPD Officers, L.A. TiMES, May 4, 1994, at
B3; Sheryl Stolberg, Once Synonymous, Gates, LAPD Go Separate Ways, L.A. TIMES, June 28,
1992, at Al.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); see supra note 5.
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tolerant of departmental racism, and a poor-i.e., negligent-supervi-
sor, and that these shortcomings led to the brutal beating inflicted by
Gates's subordinates, King should have been allowed to proceed with
his claims against Gates. If Gates was not entitled to qualified immu-
nity-if the beating violated King's clearly established constitutional
rights and Gates, as a reasonable manager, should have known that-
there is no justification for imposing a standard of supervisory culpa-
bility that absolves him from liability.
After summarizing the few Supreme Court opinions touching on
this question, part I of this article describes the different standards of
supervisory liability currently being applied by the federal courts of
appeals. Part II examines the rationales the courts have used to justify
adopting the various standards they have chosen and concludes that
no principled explanation has been advanced for any of the competing
standards. Part III then critiques the court decisions applying the var-
ious standards of supervisory liability, arguing that the courts have not
consistently applied the factors that are relevant in determining
whether a supervisor ought to be subjected to liability on the facts of a
particular case. Finally, part IV advocates that the confusion sur-
rounding this area of the law be resolved by adopting a negligence
standard of liability for supervisory officials and giving effect to the
prudential concerns that militate against liability primarily when con-
sidering the defendant's qualified immunity defense.
I. THE VARYING STANDARDS OF SUPERVISORY LIABILITY
A. The Supreme Court Precedents
The Supreme Court has provided surprisingly little guidance on
the reach of supervisory liability in Section 1983 cases. In fact, the
only Supreme Court decision directly focusing on this issue is a five-
to-four opinion issued twenty years ago in Rizzo v. Goode.12 In that
case, the plaintiffs sued the Mayor of Philadelphia, the city's Manag-
ing Director, the Police Commissioner, and two other police depart-
ment supervisors, alleging a "pervasive pattern of illegal and
unconstitutional mistreatment by police officers ... directed against
minority citizens in particular and against all Philadelphia residents in
general."'1 3 Specifically, the plaintiffs charged the supervisory officials
with "conduct ranging from express authorization or encouragement
of this mistreatment to failure to act in a manner so as to assure that it
would not recur in the future."' 4 The lower courts found in favor of
the plaintiffs and issued an injunction mandating that the parties de-
12. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
13. Id. at 366-67.
14. Id. at 367.
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velop "'a comprehensive program for improving the handling of citi-
zen complaints alleging police misconduct.' "15
The Supreme Court clearly disapproved of the injunction issued
by the lower courts, but the precise reasoning underlying its decision
is somewhat murky. The majority opinion mentioned a number of
factors, only one of which touched on the question of supervisory lia-
bility.16 In the portion of the opinion relevant to supervisory liability,
the Court noted that "there was no affirmative link between the oc-
currence of the various incidents of police misconduct and the adop-
tion of any plan or policy by [the supervisors]-express or
otherwise-showing their authorization or approval of such miscon-
duct.'1 7 Although the Court did not disturb the district court's finding
that at least some of the incidents cited in the plaintiffs' complaints
involved constitutional misconduct on the part of individual police of-
ficers,' 8 it rejected the lower courts' conclusion that the supervisory
defendants had therefore "fail[ed] to act in the face of a statistical
pattern" of constitutional wrongdoing by their subordinates.' 9
Rather, the Court found that the factual findings made by the district
court did not reveal a sufficient pattern of misconduct, and in fact that
there had been "no showing that the behavior of the Philadelphia po-
lice was different in kind or degree from that which exists
elsewhere."2
15. Id. at 365 (quoting district court's order).
16. The other reasons for reversal mentioned in the Court's opinion were that the plaintiffs
had not made the showing of likelihood of future injury required to obtain injunctive relief, see
id. at 371-73; that the scope of the injunction issued by the district court impermissibly exceeded
the scope of the constitutional violation, see id. at 377-78; and that the district court had "in-
jected itself by injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary affairs of [a] state agency," thus
violating "principles of equity, comity, and federalism." Id. at 379-80 (citation omitted).
17. Id. at 371.
18. In fact, as the Court noted, the parties had accepted the district court's findings of fact
by the time the case reached the Court. See id. at 367.
19. Id. at 376 (emphasis omitted).
20. Id. at 375. Three years later, however, the Justice Department filed an "unprece-
dented" civil suit against the city of Philadelphia and 18 high-ranking city officials, alleging that
they had condoned a systematic pattern of police brutality. Charles R. Babcock, Justice Accuses
Philadelphia of Police Abuses, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1979, at Al. The suit was later dismissed
on the grounds that neither the civil rights statutes nor the Constitution authorized the Federal
Government to file a civil cause of action seeking to enjoin constitutional violations. See United
States v. Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980). But cf 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1994) (statute
passed in 1994 prohibits governmental authorities and their agents from "engag[ing] in a pattern
or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers... that deprives persons of rights, privileges,
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States" and autho-
rizes the Attorney General to bring a civil action to "obtain appropriate equitable and declara-
tory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice").
Currently, the Justice Department is again considering investigating the Philadelphia police
department. A number of its officers have been accused of manufacturing evidence, falsifying
police reports, coercing confessions, and beating suspects, and six officers have already pleaded
guilty. As a result of this misconduct, 137 convictions have been reversed and the city has paid
seven million dollars in damages. See Curriden, supra note 10, at 63; Wrongful Jailing to Cost
Philadelphia $1 Million, N.Y. TtMEs, Aug. 17, 1996, at A20.
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Two years later, in Monell v. Department of Social Services,21 the
Court addressed the scope of municipal liability in Section 1983 cases.
Monell's holding-that Section 1983 was not meant to make cities lia-
ble for the constitutional misdeeds of their employees on a respondeat
superior basis,2 2 but only for violations that resulted from an official
municipal policy or custom-is not directly applicable to suits against
supervisors in their individual capacities.2 3 But Monell observed that
Rizzo "appear[ed]" to reject the argument that Section 1983 liability
can be premised on "the mere right to control without any control or
direction having been exercised and without any failure to super-
vise,"24 and thereby signalled the Court's unwillingness to impose re-
spondeat superior liability on supervisors as well.
B. The Court of Appeals Cases
The courts of appeals have interpreted Rizzo's requirement of an
"affirmative link" between the supervisor and the constitutional mis-
conduct of her subordinate as the touchstone for supervisory liability
in Section 1983 cases.25 In applying this standard, the lower courts
now agree that the Supreme Court's opinions in Monell and Rizzo
have rejected respondeat superior liability for supervisors as well as
municipalities.26 At the other extreme, the courts of appeals have re-
fused to limit a supervisor's liability to the most egregious cases-
those where she ordered or authorized the constitutional wrong, or
was present and failed to prevent her subordinates from infringing the
21. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
22. As defined in Monell, respondeat superior liability means holding a municipality liable
"solely because it employs a tortfeasor"-that is, one who acted unconstitutionally. Id. at 691.
23. When a Section 1983 suit is brought against a state official in her individual, or per-
sonal, capacity, she is personally responsible for any damages awarded to the plaintiff. A Section
1983 suit filed against a state official in her official capacity is a suit against the office the defend-
ant holds, and thus in essence a suit against her governmental employer. The employer must pay
any damages awarded to the Plaintiff, and the plaintiff must satisfy Monell's official policy or
custom requirement in order to prevail. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). See generally
1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGrHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LMGATION: THE LAW OF SEC-
TnON 1983, at 488-90 (3d ed. 1991).
24. 436 U.S. at 694 n.58. For further discussion of Monell's reasoning and its applicability
to suits against supervisors, see infra notes 72-90 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Snell v. Thnnell, 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976
(1991); Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir. 1989); Gilmere v. City of
Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1504 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 & 1124
(1986). But cf Mark R. Brown, Accountability in Government and Section 1983, 25 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORm 53, 77 (1991) (arguing that Rizzo does not define "the precise limits of supervisory
liability" because it is in essence an "institutional case" that named the supervisors as defendants
only because Section 1983 suits could not be brought against cities prior to Monell) (emphasis
omitted).
26. See 1 NAHMOD, supra note 23, at 237. At one time, some courts were willing to impose
respondeat superior liability on supervisors in Section 1983 cases, especially where the doctrine
had been adopted by state law. See, e.g., Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238, 242-43 (4th Cir. 1973).
More recently, those cases have been abandoned. See, e.g., Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433,
1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993); Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (5th Cir. 1979).
No. 1]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
plaintiff's rights.27  In such cases, the supervisor has clearly "sub-
jected" the plaintiff to a deprivation of rights, or "caused" her to be so
subjected, and liability is thus easily proven. But the lower courts
have also acknowledged that the requisite "affirmative link" can be
shown where a supervisor does not order or witness the constitutional
violation.
It is in these cases, however, that the courts have disagreed as to
what level of culpability must be shown to justify imposing liability on
a supervisor. In fact, some jurisdictions have not consistently applied
the same standard of liability from case to case28-or sometimes even
in the same opinion.29 In many cases, a supervisor is said to be re-
sponsible for the unconstitutional behavior of her subordinates if she
acted recklessly or with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's
rights.3 ° In other cases, the same courts have indicated that Section
1983 liability may be imposed on supervisors only if they knew of and
acquiesced in the constitutional violation.31 Finally, a few courts have
27. See Swint v. City of Wadley, 51 F.3d 988, 999 (11th Cir. 1995); Maldonado-Denis v.
Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 582 (1st Cir. 1994); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443,
452 n.6 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994); Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946
F.2d 630, 645 (9th Cir. 1991); Snell, 920 F.2d at 700.
28. See infra notes 29-32 (citing conflicting cases from the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits).
29. See Hegarty v. Somerset County, 53 F.3d 1367, 1380 (1st Cir.) (indicating that supervi-
sory liability rests on finding of "supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence" or
"gross negligence ... amounting to deliberate indifference") (emphasis and citations omitted),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 675 (1995); Larez, 946 F.2d at 646 (noting that supervisors can be held
liable for their" 'acquiesce[nce] in the constitutional deprivation' " or for "conduct that showed
'a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others"') (citations omitted). But cf. Gutierrez-
Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 562 (concluding that there is "no difference of moment" between a stan-
dard of "gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference" and a standard of "reckless or
callous indifference").
30. Language to this effect appears in opinions from the F'rst, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. See, e.g., Starzenski v. City of Elkhart, 87 F.3d 872,
880 (7th Cir. 1996) ("knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly cause[ ] the alleged deprivation");
Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Detention Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1192 (11th Cir. 1994) ("reckless or
callous indifference"); White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994) ("deliberate indiffer-
ence or tacit authorization"); Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist, 15 F.3d at 453-54 ("deliberate indiffer-
ence"); Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 1994) ("reckless or
callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others"); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th
Cir.) ("deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices"), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 67-68 (1994); Gates v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 449, 996 F.2d 1035, 1041 (10th
Cir. 1993) ("displayed deliberate indifference to or tacitly authorized the unconstitutional acts");
Black by Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 712 (3d Cir. 1993) ("deliberate indiffer-
ence"); Larez, 946 F.2d at 646 ("reckless or callous indifference").
31. Language to this effect appears in opinions from the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. See, e.g., Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir.
1995) ("knowledge and consent"); Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 490 (10th Cir. 1995) ("actually
knew of and acquiesced in [the subordinate's] behavior"); Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d
1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 1995) ("actual knowledge and acquiescence"); Ripson v. Alles, 21 F.3d 805,
809 (8th Cir. 1994) ("know[s] about the conduct and facilitate[s] it, approve[s] it, condone[s] it,
or turn[s] a blind eye for fear of what [he] might see"); Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d
1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993) ("at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in
the unconstitutional conduct"); Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1159-60 (5th Cir. 1992)
("[knew] about the conduct and facilitate[d] it, approve[d] it, condone[d] it, or turn[ed] a blind
[Vol. 1997
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suggested that gross negligence is the appropriate standard of liabil-
ity.32  Although some older cases applied a simple negligence stan-
dard,33 the courts now uniformly reject negligence as the standard of
liability for supervisors in Section 1983 cases. 34
In addition to adopting differing standards of culpability, the
lower courts have given conflicting signals as to whether they require
proof of actual knowledge or are willing to impose liability in cases
where the supervisor had constructive knowledge. Some cases have
suggested that a supervisor may not be subjected to liability unless she
was actually aware of her subordinate's constitutional misconduct.35
Other cases have indicated that liability should be imposed when the
supervisor was aware of a risk that her subordinate was acting in vio-
lation of the Constitution.36 Still others require only proof that the
eye for fear of what [he] might see"); Larez, 946 F.2d at 646 ("acquiesce[d] in the constitutional
deprivation").
32. The Second Circuit is the only jurisdiction that consistently applies this standard today.
See Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) ("gross negligence in managing subordi-
nates"); Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); cf. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190,
199 (5th Cir. 1996) (supervisor's failure to train or supervise must "amount[ ] to gross negligence
or deliberate indifference"); Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 582 (noting that "[g]ross negligence
can signify deliberate indifference and serve as a basis for supervisory liability if it is causally
connected to the actions that work the direct constitutional injury").
33. See McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1391 (7th Cir. 1984); Marchant v. City
of Little Rock, 741 F.2d 201, 204 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Brown, supra note 25, at 65-66 (noting
that courts generally applied negligence standard in the 1970s).
34. See Ripson, 21 F.3d at 809; Febus-Rodriguez, 14 F.3d at 92-93; Gates, 996 F.2d at 1043;
Black, 985 F.2d at 712-13; Sanders, 950 F.2d at 1159-60; Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836
(11th Cir. 1990); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988); Haynesworth v.
Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1260-61 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also cases cited infra note 242. Several
commentators have, however, endorsed a negligence standard. See Brown, supra note 25, at
106-09; Note, A Theory of Negligence for Constitutional Torts, 92 YALE L.J. 683 (1983).
Admittedly, the difference between these various terms is somewhat "elusive." Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 (1986); see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAw OF TORTS § 34, at 210-14 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that ordinary negligence, gross negligence,
and recklessness are different in degree, rather than kind). Nevertheless, as a general matter,
knowledge and acquiescence is considered a higher standard than reckless or deliberate indiffer-
ence, see, e.g., Baker, 50 F.3d at 1194 n.5, which in turn is regarded as a more culpable standard
than gross negligence. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 & n.7 (1989); Taylor
Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d at 453 n.7 (noting that deliberate indifference and gross negligence
involve "different degrees of certainty ... that negative consequences will result," and referring
to gross negligence as a "heightened degree of negligence," whereas deliberate indifference is a
"lesser form of intent"); Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 567. But cf Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.
Ct. 1970, 1978-79 (1994) (equating recklessness and deliberate indifference, but noting that reck-
lessness is "not self-defining," and in fact has been defined both subjectively-to require aware-
ness of the risk of harm-and objectively-to impose liability where the risk was "so obvious
that it should be known"); KEETON ET AL., supra, § 34, at 214 (noting that gross neg!igence and
recklessness "have tended to merge and take on the same meaning").
35. See Jojola, 55 F.3d at 490; Baker, 50 F.3d at 1194 & n.5; Woodward v. City of Worland,
977 F.2d 1392, 1399 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 923 (1993); Sanders v. Brewer, 972
F.2d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 1992); Manarite by Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 956 (1st
Cir.) (requiring actual knowledge or at least willful blindness), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 837 (1992).
This standard corresponds to the mens rea of knowledge in criminal law. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (Official Draft 1985).
36. See, e.g., Hall v. Lombardi, 996 F.2d 954, 961 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting requirement of
actual knowledge, and instead indicating that reckless disregard will suffice), cert. denied, 510
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supervisor should have been aware of the constitutional wrong.37 The
position a court takes on this question does not necessarily turn on the
standard of liability it has chosen,3 8 and in fact, the courts are not
necessarily consistent from case to case 9-or even within the same
opinion1° -on this issue.
II. JUSTIFYING THE VARYING STANDARDS OF SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY
Although the courts of appeals have not been consistent in choos-
ing a standard of liability for supervisors in Section 1983 cases, they
have been consistent in failing to provide much in the way of justifica-
tion for whichever standard they have adopted. Admittedly, Congress
and the Supreme Court have not given the lower courts much gui-
dance on this issue. Neither the text nor the legislative history of Sec-
tion 1983 suggests that Congress intended to impose a particular
standard of liability on supervisors, and the Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the question directly only by holding that some level of culpa-
bility is required.4' Although the courts of appeals have relied on
Supreme Court precedents that discuss other aspects of Section 1983
litigation, those cases make for poor doctrinal analogies.
U.S. 1047 (1994); Gates, 996 F.2d at 1041-42 n.1 (requiring at least "conscious acceptance of a
known risk"). This standard corresponds to the criminal law's mens rea of recklessness. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Official Draft 1985).
37. See Wright, 21 F.3d at 501; Febus-Rodriguez, 14 F.3d at 92-93; Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d
791, 799 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 67-68 (1994); Hall, 996 F.2d at 961-62; Larez, 946 F.2d
at 646. This standard corresponds to the mens rea of negligence in criminal law. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (Official Draft 1985).
38. Of the cases cited in note 35 supra that require proof of actual knowledge, Jojola and
Baker were applying a standard of knowledge and acquiescence; Sanders and Manarite were
applying a standard of deliberate indifference; and the opinion in Woodward contains language
incorporating both standards. See Jojola, 55 F.3d at 490; Baker, 50 F.3d at 1194; Woodward, 977
F.2d at 1399-1400; Sanders, 972 F.2d at 923; Manarite, 957 F.2d at 957.
Of the cases cited in note 36 supra that require awareness of a risk of constitutional injury,
the courts in both Hall and Gates were applying a standard of recklessness or deliberate indiffer-
ence. See Hall, 996 F.2d at 961; Gates, 996 F.2d at 1041.
Of the cases cited in note 37 supra that impose liability in cases of constructive knowledge,
the courts in Febus-Rodriguez, Shaw, and Hall were applying a standard of reckless or deliberate
indifference; the court in Wright was applying a standard of gross negligence; and the opinion in
Larez contains language consistent with both the deliberate indifference and the knowledge and
acquiescence standards. See Wright, 21 F.3d at 501; Febus-Rodriguez, 14 F.3d at 92; Shaw, 13
F.3d at 799; Hall, 996 F.2d at 961; Larez, 946 F.2d at 646.
39. See supra notes 35-37 (citing conflicting cases from the First, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits).
40. In Jojola, f6r example, the Tenth Circuit declared that proof of actual knowledge was
required but, in the next breath, rejected the plaintiffs' claim of constructive knowledge on the
merits. See Joola, 55 F.3d at 490-91. Likewise, in Hall, the Eighth Circuit indicated that proof
of reckless disregard suffices but then suggested that the question for the jury was whether the
supervisors knew or should have known about the constitutional violation. See Hall, 996 F.2d at
961-62.
41. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
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A. The Language and Legislative History of Section 1983
Section 1983 is a very terse statute,42 and nothing in its language
speaks directly to the standard of liability that ought to be imposed in
cases involving supervisory officials. By providing that a state official
is liable whenever she "subjects" another person to a deprivation of
rights or "causes" her to be so subjected, the statute suggests that
plaintiffs must demonstrate some culpable act on the part of each de-
fendant, as well as a causal link between that act and the constitu-
tional violation.43 Beyond that, the statutory language does not point
to a particular point on the continuum of potential liability stan-
dards-ranging from the relatively low threshold of culpability that
imposes liability for negligent conduct to the very high threshold that
demands proof of a malicious purpose to cause constitutional injury.
Nothing in the provision's sparse legislative history sheds further
light on the question of supervisory liability. The bill that included
Section 1983 was passed hurriedly, and, as with many of the issues that
arise in Section 1983 litigation, Congress provided no guidance on the
intended scope of the provision.' Thus, here, as elsewhere, Congress
delegated to the federal courts the task of developing the law.45
B. Supreme Court Precedent
Some courts of appeals have relied on Supreme Court precedent
to justify the standard of liability they have chosen to impose on su-
pervisors in Section 1983 cases, even though none of the Supreme
Court's opinions are controlling-or even particularly persuasive-on
this issue.
42. See supra note 5.
43. For further discussion of the causation requirement in Section 1983 cases and its appli-
cation to claims against supervisors, see infra notes 103, 176-90 and accompanying text.
44. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978) (noting that the bill
containing Section 1983 was passed by both the House and Senate within three weeks of its
introduction in the House and that Section 1983 was "the subject of only limited debate");
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-74 (1961) (observing that Section 1983 was passed less than
one month after President Grant sent a message to Congress requesting legislation).
45. See generally Theodore Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil Rights Cases: The Proper
Scope of Section 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 509-10 (1980) (noting that "section 1983 does not
address a host of ... issues," including damages, affirmative defenses, immunities, statutes of
limitations, and survival of actions); Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions:
Some Old Light on Section 1988, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 603 (1985) (describing Section 1983 as
"[liaconically drafted" and "a blank canvas upon which the federal courts must sketch the details
of a cause of action"); Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983's
Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 760 (1992) (referring to Section 1983 as "almost entirely a
judicial construct"); cf William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479, 1488 (1987) (noting that the language of Section 1983 "gives the Court a great deal of
freedom in interpreting it" and that "the statute's interpretation and the needs and values of
society have changed substantially" since its enactment, and therefore concluding that "the his-
torical perspective [is] less persuasive" and the statute ought to be interpreted dynamically).
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The Court's opinion in Rizzo v. Goode requires an "affirmative
link" between the supervisor and the constitutional violation,' and
dictum in Monell v. Department of Social Services describes Rizzo as
rejecting a standard of strict vicarious liability for supervisors and in-
stead requiring evidence of a "failure to supervise."47 But the Court
has given no more specific guidelines as to precisely what constitutes
an "affirmative link," or how egregious a "failure to supervise" is re-
quired to make out a case against a supervisor. Any level of culpabil-
ity ranging from negligence to deliberate intent would appear faithful
to the language in these opinions.
Nevertheless, some courts of appeals have relied on Supreme
Court precedent that is not directly on point, but that they view as
analogous-most notably, cases discussing the state-of-mind require-
ments for various constitutional violations s and cases addressing mu-
nicipal liability in Section 1983 suits.49 As explained below, reliance
on these opinions is misplaced.
1. The State-of-Mind Cases
A Section 1983 plaintiff must, of course, establish that a state offi-
cial violated her constitutional rights, and proof of the constitutional
violation may require evidence that the state official acted with a par-
ticular state of mind.50 In choosing a standard of supervisory liability,
some courts of appeals have relied on Supreme Court opinions that
address the state of mind necessary to make out a violation of particu-
lar constitutional rights.
In Daniels v. Williams 51 and Davidson v. Cannon,5 2 for example,
the Supreme Court held that a due process violation requires proof of
a state of mind more culpable than negligence. Some courts of ap-
peals have cited those opinions in rejecting negligence as the standard
of supervisory liability. Thus, for instance, the Tenth Circuit reasoned
in Jojola v. Chavez 3 that, because " '[liability under § 1983 must be
predicated upon a "deliberate" deprivation of constitutional rights by
the defendant,' and not on negligence, ... [t]herefore, to impose per-
sonal liability on [supervisory officials], plaintiffs must allege, and
46. 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
47. 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978); see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 50-71 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 72-113 and accompanying text.
50. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (requiring proof of deliberate indif-
ference to prove violation of the Eighth Amendment); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40
(1976) (requiring proof of an intent to discriminate in order to prove violation of the Equal
Protection Clause).
51. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
52. 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
53. 55 F.3d 488 (10th Cir. 1995).
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prove, [that the supervisors] actually knew of and acquiesced in" the
constitutional violation.54
In Daniels and Davidson, the Supreme Court overruled its earlier
decision in Parratt v. Taylor,55 which had held that a negligent taking
of property "amounted to a deprivation"56 of due process within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause.57 In overruling Parratt, the Court
held in Daniels and Davidson that "the word 'deprive' in the Due
Process Clause connote[s] more than a negligent act," and therefore
"the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of
an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or prop-
erty."58 Though holding that the Due Process Clause requires proof
of a state of mind more culpable than negligence, the Court did not
suggest that Section 1983 likewise demands proof that the state official
acted with a culpability greater than negligence. In fact, the Court did
not retreat from the other holding in Parratt-that Section 1983 con-
tains no independent state-of-mind requirement,5 9 so that the plain-
tiff's only burden is to prove that the defendant acted with the state of
mind required to violate the particular constitutional provision at is-
sue.6" And the Court expressly refused to "rule out the possibility
that there are other constitutional provisions that would be violated
by mere lack of care."'"
54. Id. at 490 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392,
1399 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 923 (1993) (which relied, in turn, on Daniels and
Davidson)); see also Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988).
55. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
56. Id. at 536-37.
57. The Due Process Clause prohibits the states from "depriv[ing] any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
58. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330, 328. Although the Court observed that "[h]istorically, this
guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions of government officials to
deprive a person of life, liberty, or property," id. at 331, the Court expressly declined to decide
precisely what state of mind was required to make out a claim under the Due Process Clause.
See id. at 334 n.3 ("[T]his case affords us no occasion to consider whether something less than
intentional conduct, such as recklessness or 'gross negligence,' is enough to trigger the protec-
tions of the Due Process Clause.").
59. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535.
60. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328.
61. Id. at 334; see also Parratt, 451 U.S. at 534 (noting that "[n]othing in the language of
§ 1983 or its legislative history limits the statute solely to intentional deprivations of constitu-
tional rights," and that the Court's earlier opinion in Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979),
"suggested that simply because a wrong was negligently as opposed to intentionally committed
did not foreclose the possibility that such action could be brought under § 1983"); Baker, 443
U.S. at 139-40 ("[T]he question whether an allegation of simple negligence is sufficient to state a
cause of action under § 1983 is more elusive than it appears at first blush. It may well not be
susceptible of a uniform answer across the entire spectrum of conceivable constitutional viola-
tions...."); cf. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (holding that all Section 1983 claims
alleging that the police used an excessive amount of force in arresting, stopping, or seizing a
suspect are to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which inquires whether "the officers'
actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,
without regard to their underlying intent or motivation").
Moreover, the Court's justifications for interpreting the Due Process Clause to require more
than negligence-to protect against the "trivializ[ation]" of the Clause, to limit its application to
cases involving an "abuse of power," and to ensure that the Constitution does not "supplant
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Likewise, courts of appeals in other supervisory liability cases
have mistakenly relied on the Supreme Court's substantive interpreta-
tion of the Eighth Amendment in Farmer v. Brennan62 to support an
unnecessarily generous standard of supervisory liability. Farmer
adopted a "subjective" definition of the "deliberate indifference"
needed to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment, holding that "a prison official may be
held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane condi-
tions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial
risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reason-
able measures to abate it."' 63 In choosing this "subjective" definition
of deliberate indifference, the Court rejected the so-called objective
approach, which imposes liability on one who "acts... in the face of
an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious
that it should be known."'  Following this lead, the Eighth Circuit
rejected the plaintiff's argument in Boyd v. Knox 65 that a supervisor
can be held liable if she either knew or should have known about her
subordinate's misconduct, reasoning simply that "[t]his argument is
expressly foreclosed by Farmer.v. Brennan."66
But the Court in Farmer was careful to point out that it was not
issuing an abstract definition of the term "deliberate indifference" for
all purposes. Rather, the Court made clear, the definition of deliber-
ate indifference adopted in Farmer was "based on the Constitution
and our [Eighth Amendment] cases, not merely on a parsing of the
phrase 'deliberate indifference.' 67 And the Court acknowledged that
it had adopted a more objective definition of deliberate indifference in
City of Canton v. Harris ,68 an earlier opinion discussing the scope of a
city's Section 1983 liability for constitutional violations-in that case,
an alleged violation of the Due Process Clause.69 But the Farmer
traditional tort law"-are irrelevant in cases where the plaintiff has clearly suffered a constitu-
tional injury, and the question is whether to hold a supervisor accountable for her subordinate's
nontrivial abuse of power. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332.
62. 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994).
63. Id. at 1984 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 1978 (emphasis added). For the view that the Court's ruling is "misguided,"
"unjust and unworkable," and "effectively leaves inhumane prison conditions without constitu-
tional remedy," see The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139,
240, 239, 235 (1994) (advocating that the subjective definition should be applied only in prison
cases involving isolated events).
65. 47 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 1995).
66. Id. at 968 n.1. Although Boyd is an Eighth Amendment case, the language quoted in
the text seems to be part of the court's general discussion of supervisory liability in Section 1983
cases.
67. 114 S. Ct. at 1980.
68. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
69. See id. at 385-92. In Canton, the Court held that a city can be held liable under Section
1983 for a constitutional violation that results from its failure to train its employees so long as the
city was "deliberately indifferent" to the rights of its inhabitants. In so ruling, the Court noted:
[I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need
for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the
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Court rejected the plaintiff's reliance on Canton's more objective
standard:
Canton's objective standard.., is not an appropriate test for de-
termining the liability of prison officials under the Eighth
Amendment as interpreted in our cases. Section 1983, which
merely provides a cause of action, "contains no state-of-mind re-
quirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of
the underlying constitutional right" [quoting Daniels v. Williams].
And while deliberate indifference serves under the Eighth
Amendment to ensure that only inflictions of punishment carry
liability, the "term was used in the Canton case for the quite dif-
ferent purpose of identifying the threshold for holding a city re-
sponsible for the constitutional torts committed by its
inadequately trained agents," a purpose the Canton Court found
satisfied by a test permitting liability when a municipality disre-
gards "obvious" needs.7 °
Thus, as Farmer makes clear, it is wrong for the lower courts to choose
a standard of supervisory liability for all Section 1983 cases by blindly
following the Supreme Court opinions analyzing the state of mind
necessary to make out a violation of a particular constitutional provi-
sion. To do so is to confuse two independent elements of a Section
1983 cause of action: proof of a constitutional violation, with its at-
tendant state-of-mind inquiry, and the appropriate standard of super-
visory liability.71
violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to
have been deliberately indifferent to the need.
Id. at 390. For further discussion of Canton and its applicability to suits involving supervisors,
see infra notes 91-113 and accompanying text.
70. 114 S. Ct. at 1981 (citations omitted).
71. One commentator has suggested a variation on this theme-that supervisors should be
held liable in Section 1983 cases only if they had whatever state of mind is necessary to make out
a violation of the constitutional right on which the plaintiff's suit is based. See Sheldon H.
Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1, 18-22
(1982). Unlike the court of appeals opinions criticized in text, this proposal does not advocate
that a particular mens rea be required across the board for all supervisory liability cases, but
instead that the state of mind required in any given case track the state of mind required for the
specific constitutional provision at issue. Under Professor Nahmod's proposal, therefore, not
only the subordinate directly responsible for violating the plaintiff's rights, but also the supervi-
sor, would have to have the mens rea necessary to prove that particular constitutional violation.
Although Nahmod's approach is not guilty of conflating the state-of-mind inquiry with the
standard of supervisory liability in the same way as the court of appeals opinions discussed in
text, he would add a requirement to the plaintiffs case that is not contemplated by the language
of Section 1983. The statute merely requires that the plaintiff suffered a constitutional injury-
thus requiring proof that the subordinate acted with the requisite mens rea-and that the super-
visor "caused" the plaintiff to be subjected to that violation. Moreover, Nahmod would, in es-
sence, require the plaintiff to prove that the supervisor herself violated the Constitution, thus
mooting the very question of a supervisor's accountability for the constitutional wrongs of her
subordinates.
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2. The Municipal Liability Cases
In other supervisory liability cases, the courts of appeals have
borrowed-typically, with little analysis or explanation-the stan-
dards for municipal liability that the Court has adopted for Section
1983 cases. As noted above, the Court's opinion in Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Services held that a city may be subjected to liability
under Section 1983 only if the plaintiff's constitutional injury resulted
from an official municipal policy or custom. 72 Apparently relying on
this holding, the Fourth Circuit noted in Strickler v. Waters73 that
"[b]ecause [the supervisor] cannot be held vicariously liable for any
conduct of his subordinates, [the plaintiff] must show 'that the conduct
directly causing the deprivation was done to effectuate an official pol-
icy or custom for which [the supervisor] was responsible.' 74  Like-
wise, in Schmelz v. Monroe County,7 5 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the trial court's order granting summary judgment to a supervisory
official on the grounds that "there existed no evidence that [he]
promulgated an unconstitutional policy or custom that led to [the
plaintiff's] injuries. '76
Monell's rationale for rejecting respondeat superior liability for
cities and instead requiring proof of an official municipal policy or
custom does not apply to the quite distinct issue of supervisory liabil-
ity.77 To be sure, as noted above, dictum in the Court's opinion in
Monell suggests that vicarious liability should not be applied to super-
72. 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978); see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. The plain-
tiffs in Monell were a group of female employees who sued to challenge a city policy that re-
quired pregnant women to take maternity leave before medically necessary, a practice that the
Supreme Court had previously struck down in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1974).
73. 989 F.2d 1375 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 949 (1993).
74. Id. at 1387 (citation omitted).
75. 954 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1992).
76. Id. at 1544; see also Mackinney v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting
claims against chief of police because "we are hard pressed to find any evidence of a policy that
'repudiates' constitutional rights"); Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Detention Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176,
1194 (11th Cir. 1994) (rejecting claim against individual defendant on grounds that he did not
have final policy-making authority); Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725-26
(3d Cir. 1989) (requiring proof that supervisor had a policy or custom of deliberate indifference
to subordinates' constitutional wrongs), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990); cf. Larson by Larson
v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1453 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (using virtually identical language in
describing standard of liability for supervisors and school district); Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6
F.3d 1233, 1240-41 (7th Cir. 1993) (using reasoning to reject Section 1983 claim against city that
is indistinguishable from reasoning that would be used to analyze claim against supervisor),
modified on other grounds, Nos. 89-3747 & 90-2216, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31896 (7th Cir. Dec.
8, 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1844 (1994); Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st
Cir. 1988) (using same standard of liability for supervisors sued in official and individual
capacity).
77. As explained in note 23, supra, the special requirements for Section 1983 suits involving
municipalities do apply to claims filed against city officials-including supervisors-in their offi-
cial capacities, but not to those filed against city officials in their individual or personal capaci-
ties. The cases described in this section fall into the latter category.
[Vol. 1997
SECTION 1983 SUPERVISORY LIABILITY
visors,78 but Section 1983's requirement of a causal link between the
supervisor and the plaintiff's constitutional injury79 itself is sufficient
reason to require some culpability on the part of the supervisor.8 0 Be-
yond that, neither the text of the statute nor Monell's rejection of vi-
carious liability for cities sheds any light on the standard of culpability
that ought to apply to supervisors.
In declining to impose vicarious liability on cities, Monell relied
on both the causation language in Section 198381 and the portion of
the legislative debates in which Congress rejected an amendment to
another section of the bill, not to Section 1983. That amendment, the
so-called Sherman amendment, would have made a municipality liable
for "damage done to the person or property of its inhabitants by pri-
vate persons 'riotously and tumultuously assembled."'" The Monell
Court acknowledged that, "[s]trictly speaking .... the fact that Con-
gress refused to impose vicarious liability for the wrongs of a few pri-
vate citizens does not conclusively establish that it would similarly
have refused to impose vicarious liability for the torts of a municipal-
ity's employees. '"83 Nevertheless, mindful of Congress's concerns
about the constitutionality of imposing obligations on municipalities, '
the Court concluded that "when Congress' rejection of the only form
of vicarious liability presented to it is combined with the absence of
any language in § 1983 which can easily be construed to create respon-
deat superior liability, the inference that Congress did not intend to
impose such liability is quite strong."'85
The most that can be read into this legislative history is a rejec-
tion of the strict liability associated with the doctrine of respondeat
78. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978); see supra note
24 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 5.
80. For further discussion of Section 1983's causation requirement and its application to
supervisory liability, see infra notes 103, 176-90 and accompanying text.
81. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92.
82. Id. at 664 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 749 (1871)).
An earlier version of the Sherman amendment, which was likewise rejected, would have
made any inhabitant of a city liable for such damage. See id. at 666. Because that amendment
imposed liability on private citizens rather than governmental entities or officials, it is even less
relevant to the question of supervisory liability in Section 1983 cases.
A version of the Sherman amendment was ultimately adopted as 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1994),
but it likewise has nothing to do with the type of supervisory liability at issue here. Rather, it
imposes civil liability on one who is aware that a civil rights conspiracy is about to be committed
and has the power to prevent the conspiracy but fails to do so. That provision is linked to the
cause of action created by 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994) against those who conspire to violate civil
rights, and not to Section 1983. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 668-69.
83. 436 U.S. at 693 n.57.
84. See id. at 693.
85. Id. at 693 n.57. The Court likewise dismissed two common policy justifications for re-
spondeat superior liability-that "accidents might... be reduced if employers had to bear the
cost" and that "the cost of accidents should be spread to the community as a whole on an insur-
ance theory"-on the ground that both arguments had been advanced by proponents of the
Sherman amendment and obviously found insufficiently persuasive to a majority of Congress.
Id. at 693-94.
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superior; the legislative history says nothing affirmative about what
level of culpability Congress intended to impose on supervisors. The
Monell Court may have been right to equate Congress's rejection of
vicarious liability for cities with the official policy or custom require-
ment.' After all, municipalities cannot act independently of their em-
ployees, they have no state of mind independent of their employees,
and it may seem unfair to saddle innocent taxpayers with the costs of
injuries inflicted by city employees acting on their own initiative.87
But the same cannot be said for supervisory officials: they can act
independently of their subordinates and with a different state of mind,
and there is no inequity in asking a supervisor to compensate someone
who was injured as a result of her failure to properly supervise her
subordinates. The supervisor cannot be considered "innocent," and,
as the Monell Court itself acknowledged, the Congress that enacted
Section 1983 had no qualms about the constitutionality of imposing
liability on individual state or city officials.88 Moreover, supervisory
officials have a qualified immunity defense that absolves them from
damages liability unless the constitutional violation alleged by the
plaintiff was clearly established. That defense is not available to pro-
tect municipalities, 9 but it does ensure that damages will not be as-
sessed against blameless supervisors.9 Accordingly, there is no
justification for importing Monell's official policy and custom require-
ment into supervisory liability cases.
In a more recent municipal liability case, City of Canton v. Har-
ris,9 the Supreme Court held that Section 1983 liability can be im-
posed on a city that fails to adequately train the employees who
violate a plaintiff's constitutional rights, but only if "the failure to train
amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom
the [employees] come into contact."92 Some courts of appeals have
86. This point has not, however, been uncontroversial. For criticism of the Court's ruling in
Monell, see City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 841-42 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic Anal-
ysis, 1987 Sup. Cr. REV. 249,255-61; Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 45, at 787; Susanah M. Mead,
42 U.S. C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L.
REV. 517, 532-46 (1986); Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional
Torts, 85 MicH. L. REV. 225,235-38 (1986); Charles A. Rothfeld, Comment, Section 1983 Munic-
ipal Liability and the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 935 (1978).
87. Cf. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 265-67 (1981) (making this
argument in context of holding that punitive damages may not be assessed against municipal
defendants in Section 1983 cases).
88. See 436 U.S. at 682.
89. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (holding that cities may not
avail themselves of the good faith defense available to executive branch officials in Section 1983
cases).
90. For further discussion of the qualified immunity defense, see infra notes 245-53 and
accompanying text.
91. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
92. Id. at 388. The plaintiff in City of Canton alleged a violation of her due process right to
receive necessary medical care while in police custody. She attempted to implicate the city in
that violation by arguing that it had failed to adequately train police department employees
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relied on this holding to likewise absolve supervisors from liability ab-
sent a showing of deliberate indifference on their part. In Doe v. Tay-
lor Independent School District,93 for example, the Fifth Circuit
explained:
A municipality, with its broad obligation to supervise all of its
employees, is liable under § 1983 if it supervises its employees in
a manner that manifests deliberate indifference to the constitu-
tional rights of citizens. We see no principled reason why an indi-
vidual to whom the municipality has delegated responsibility to
directly supervise the employee should not be held liable under
the same standard. 94
Likewise, in Greason v. Kemp,95 the Eleventh Circuit decided to bor-
row City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard for supervisory
liability cases, reasoning that "[b]ecause a supervisor's orders and di-
rections are tantamount to official policy in the eyes of a subordinate,
we find the analogous situation of municipal liability under City of
Canton to be helpful."96
This reliance is misplaced: the Court's reasoning in City of Can-
ton v. Harris is premised in large part on Monell's official policy or
custom requirement, a requirement that is limited to suits against cit-
ies and has no applicability to suits against supervisory officials in
their personal capacity.97 Specifically, the Court explained in City of
Canton:
Only where a municipality's failure to train its employees in
a relevant respect evidences a "deliberate indifference" to the
rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly
thought of as a city "policy or custom" that is actionable under
§ 1983. As Justice Brennan's opinion in Pembaur v. Cincinnati
put it: "[M]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches where-and
only where-a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is
made from among various alternatives" by city policymakers.
responsible for determining when to seek medical treatment for detainees. In holding that inad-
equate training programs can subject a city to Section 1983 liability, the Court rejected the con-
tention that municipal liability is limited to cases involving city policies that are unconstitutional
on their face. See id. at 386-87.
93. 15 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994).
94. Id.
95. 891 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990).
96. Id. at 837. For similar cases, see Tilson v. Forrest City Police Dep't, 28 F.3d 802, 807
(8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995); Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392,
1399-1400 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 923 (1993); Schmelz v. Monroe County, 954
F.2d 1540, 1544 (11th Cir. 1992); Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1455 (6th Cir. 1990); Wilks v.
Young, 897 F.2d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 1990); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1117-18 (3d Cir. 1989)
("[W]e are confident that... the standard of individual liability for supervisory public officials
will be found to be no less stringent than the standard of liability for the public entities that they
serve."). See also 1 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JoiiN E. KRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LTGATION:
CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES § 7.11, at 386 (2d ed. 1991).
97. For a discussion of the distinction between personal capacity and official capacity suits,
see supra note 23.
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Only where a failure to train reflects a "deliberate" or "con-
scious" choice by a municipality-a "policy" as defined by our
prior cases--can a city be liable for such a failure under § 1983.98
Some courts of appeals have also pointed to the language in City
of Canton referring to Section 1983's causation requirement to justify
applying the Canton ruling to cases involving supervisors. 9 The
Court's opinion in City of Canton made two references to the subject
of causation. It said, first, that because Monell had held that
a municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the
municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue....
our first inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability under
§ 1983 is the question whether there is a direct causal link be-
tween a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional
deprivation. 100
Second, the Canton Court noted that "a municipality can be liable
under § 1983 only where its policies are the 'moving force [behind] the
constitutional violation."""' Although Section 1983 requires gener-
ally that each defendant either "subject[ed]" the plaintiff to a depriva-
tion of constitutional rights or "cause[d] [her] to be subjected" to such
a deprivation, 02 both references to the causation requirement in City
of Canton focus on the requisite causal link between the constitutional
violation and the municipality's official policy or custom, again a re-
quirement that has no bearing on suits against supervisors in their in-
dividual capacity. Moreover, as others have persuasively argued,0 3
even a negligent act on the part of a municipality (or supervisor) can
cause a constitutional violation and thus satisfy Section 1983's causa-
tion requirement.
Admittedly, two aspects of the Court's reasoning in City of Can-
ton might be applicable to Section 1983 suits against supervisors.
First, the Court noted that a standard of culpability lower than delib-
erate indifference "would result in de facto respondeat superior liabil-
ity on municipalities" because "[i]n virtually every instance where a
person has had his or her constitutional rights violated by a city em-
ployee, a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the city
98. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (citations omitted).
99. See, e.g., Taylor Indep. Sc. Dist., 15 F.3d at 453.
100. 489 U.S. at 385.
101. Id. at 389.
102. See supra note 5.
103. See Barbara Kritchevsky, "Or Causes to be Subjected": The Role of Causation in Sec-
tion 1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1187, 1250-55 (1988); Lewis &
Blumoff, supra note 45, at 788; Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some
Lessons from Tort Law and Organization Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 1753, 1764-66 (1989); Ruth Fried-
man, Note, Municipal Liability for Police Misconduct. Must Victims Now Prove Intent?, 97 YALE
L.J. 448, 457-59 (1988). For further discussion of the causation requirement and its application in
suits involving supervisors, see infra notes 176-90 and accompanying text.
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'could have done' to prevent the unfortunate incident."'10 4 Although
the Court may be right that imposing Section 1983 liability in every
case where the defendant "could have done" something to prevent the
constitutional injury amounts to respondeat superior liability-a re-
sult prohibited as to cities by Monell and as to supervisory officials by
Rizzo-it is fiat out wrong to suggest that only a requirement of delib-
erate indifference will prevent that result. A finding of even negli-
gence cannot be based simply on the fact that the defendant "could
have done" something to prevent the plaintiff's injury, 10 5 and adopting
a lesser standard of culpability, when coupled with Section 1983's cau-
sation requirement, would therefore avoid the respondeat superior li-
ability that the Court rejected in Rizzo and Monell.
The second element of the Court's opinion in City of Canton that
might arguably apply to supervisors is its observation that "a lesser
standard of fault would . . . engage the federal courts in an endless
exercise of second-guessing municipal employee-training programs
.. [,] an exercise we believe the federal courts are ill suited to under-
take [and] one that would implicate serious questions of federal-
ism."'" Although this objection seems more properly directed at
Section 1983 claims filed against governmental entities than at those
filed against individual defendants, the Canton Court cited Rizzo in
support of its federalism argument, 0 7 and one might argue that the
same "second-guessing" the Court was concerned about in City of
Canton might occur in a suit alleging that a supervisor created or im-
plemented an inadequate training program.
Nevertheless, there are several problems with relying on this dic-
tum in cases involving supervisors. First, Rizzo's federalism concerns
were directed only at injunctive suits, which involve a " 'continuing
intrusion' " on the part of the federal courts into the operations of a
state agency, and not at damages suits. 10 8 Second, Rizzo admitted
104. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392; see Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d at 453 (relying on
this argument); Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836 (11th Cir. 1990) (same).
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 cmt. f (1965) (noting that an act is negli-
gent only if "the risk involved in it outweighs its utility," so that one has no duty to act to prevent
injury to another "if the benefit to the other is less than, or merely equal to, the utility of action
or inaction to the actor"); KEETON ET AL, supra note 34, § 29, at 162-63, § 31, at 170-71 (distin-
guishing between negligent conduct and unavoidable accidents, which do not give rise to tort
liability, and noting that even unavoidable accidents are not "entirely inevitable" and therefore
can in some sense be prevented).
106. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392; see Taylor Indep. ScL Dist., 15 F.3d at 453 (relying on
this argument).
107. 489 U.S. at 392 (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-80 (1976)).
108. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 380 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)). It is
somewhat ironic that Rizzo's federalism concerns were directed at injunctive suits, given that the
Court's Eleventh Amendment cases have traditionally viewed damages suits as more intrusive
on the states. Accordingly, the Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to bar damage
awards that will be paid out of state funds, but to permit the issuance of prospective injunctions
against state officials. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1974); Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908); see also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712 (1996) (limit-
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that the federalism concerns it raised were "initially expounded and
perhaps entitled to their greatest weight in cases [seeking] to enjoin a
criminal prosecution in progress,"'1 9 and the Court has been widely
criticized for extending those federalism arguments beyond the con-
text in which they were originally raised. 110 Third, Rizzo's suggestion
that those federalism concerns are implicated in suits against police
departments and other executive branch agencies and City of Can-
ton's discomfort with federal courts' "second-guessing" a city's train-
ing programs fly directly in the face of Section 1983, which was
obviously intended to provide a federal check on the unconstitutional
actions of state and city officials and thus, in some sense, to contra-
vene notions of federalism."'
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the federalism interests
articulated in Rizzo and reiterated in City of Canton are sufficiently
served in cases involving supervisors by the qualified immunity de-
fense. That defense, which is available to executive branch officials,
but not municipalities, 1 2 immunizes a supervisor unless the constitu-
tional rights asserted by the plaintiff were clearly established at the
time the violation occurred. As the Supreme Court has described it,
qualified immunity "provides ample protection to all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." 113 The defense
thus ensures that a supervisor will not be held liable simply because a
federal court "second-guessed" her decisions and prevents federal
judges from intruding unnecessarily into areas of state and local pre-
ing the federal courts' power to dismiss cases under the abstention doctrine to cases seeking
injunctive or declaratory relief).
109. 423 U.S. at 380. The Court was referring here to a line of cases that began with
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger, a federal district court enjoined a pending
state prosecution on the grounds that the state statute under which Harris was being prosecuted
was unconstitutional on its face. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that Harris could chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the statute as a defense to the criminal charges, and thus had an
adequate remedy at law, and that the federal court's injunction was inconsistent with principles
of comity and federalism. See id at 43-54.
110. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes
on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 65-70 (1984); Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski,
86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1153-60 (1977); The Supreme Court 1975 Term-Leading Cases, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 56, 244-47 (1976); Note, Rizzo v. Goode: Federal Remedies for Police Misconduct, 62 VA.
L. REV. 1259, 1268 (1976).
111. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (noting that "[tihe very purpose of
§ 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the
people's federal rights," and that "Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relation-
ship between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created
rights"); see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-51 (1980) (observing that the
Congress that enacted Section 1983 "sought to 'enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity"');
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 182 (1961) (noting that "by virtue of [Section 1983] federal courts
.. sit in judgment on the misdeeds of state officers").
112. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
113. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). For further discussion of the application of
this defense in suits filed against supervisory officials, see infra notes 245-53 and accompanying
text.
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rogative. In short, there is no compelling justification for extending
the Court's municipal-liability rulings-including City of Canton v.
Harris-to Section 1983 suits filed against supervisory officials.
In sum, both Section 1983's causation requirement and the
Supreme Court's decisions in Monell and Rizzo suggest that supervi-
sors should not be held vicariously liable for the constitutional wrongs
of their subordinates. Beyond that, however, the provision's lan-
guage, its legislative history, and the Court's precedents provide no
real guidance as to what standard of culpability ought to be required
in cases involving supervisory officials. The courts of appeals there-
fore cannot rely on these sources to justify any of the different stan-
dards of liability they have adopted-reckless or deliberate
indifference, knowledge and acquiescence, or gross negligence-or
their unanimous rejection of negligence as the standard of culpability.
III. APPLYING THE VARYING STANDARDS OF SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY
Regardless of which standard of supervisory liability they have
chosen, the courts of appeals tend to agree that five interrelated fac-
tors ought to be considered in applying that standard and determining
whether a particular supervisor is liable on the facts of a given case:
(1) the extent to which prior similar incidents have occurred;" 4 (2) the
supervisor's response to those prior incidents;" 5 (3) the supervisor's
response to the specific incident on which the suit is based;1 16 (4) the
extent to which the supervisor can be considered a cause of the viola-
tion;"'7 and (5) the nature of the supervisor's awareness of the consti-
tutional misconduct." 8 Although the courts agree that these are the
relevant considerations, they have not been consistent in applying
them. As a result, the courts have reached contrary outcomes in simi-
lar cases, seemingly without any regard to the particular standard of
supervisory liability they purport to be applying. And all too often,
they have been unduly generous in ruling in favor of supervisory
officials.
A. Prior Similar Incidents
One common way of demonstrating a supervisor's culpability is
to present evidence of prior incidents where the state official who vio-
lated the plaintiff's constitutional rights-or other of the supervisor's
subordinates-engaged in similar misconduct. Evidence of such prior
incidents tends to suggest that the supervisor was reckless in failing to
114. See infra notes 119-43 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 144-64 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 176-90 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 191-209 and accompanying text.
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prevent the particular recurrence of the behavior that injured the
plaintiff or that she knew of and acquiesced in the violation-and
therefore helps the plaintiff satisfy whatever standard of supervisory
liability the court has chosen.
In many of these cases, the courts of appeals have noted that one
prior incident or a series of unrelated incidents is an insufficient basis
on which to impose Section 1983 liability on a supervisor. 119 Never-
theless, in Swint v. City of Wadley,' 20 the Eleventh Circuit refused to
grant summary judgment to a sheriff, in part because he authorized a
second narcotics raid on a particular nightclub after having received
briefing on the first raid that should have led him to realize that the
earlier raid had been conducted in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The sheriff's willingness to authorize a second raid three
months later, the court said, showed his deliberate indifference.121
In cases involving stronger evidence of a pattern of constitutional
violations, the courts of appeals have also reached contrary conclu-
sions-regardless of which standard of liability they are applying. In
Shaw v. Stroud, 22 for example, the Fourth Circuit found that the fam-
ily of an arrestee who had been shot and killed by a police officer had
presented adequate evidence of deliberate indifference on the part of
the officer's former sergeant to survive summary judgment. 23 The
court reasoned that the sergeant knew of at least three prior incidents,
occurring over the course of a one-year period ending more than
eighteen months prior to the shooting at issue in the case, where the
officer had used excessive force in making an arrest, and that the ser-
geant had "responded callously and with apparent amusement" upon
being informed of those incidents.' 24
119. See Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 582 (1st Cir. 1994); Shaw v.
Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 67-68 (1994); Sanders v. Brewer, 972
F.2d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 1992); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990), cerL denied,
500 U.S. 933 (1991).
120. 51 F.3d 988 (11th Cir. 1995).
121. See id. at 999-1000; see also Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979, 989 (5th Cir. 1982) ("In
some cases ... the courts have viewed a single abuse as so flagrant that it gives rise to an
inference that the supervisory official must have breached his duty of proper supervision.").
122. 13 F.3d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 67-68 (1994).
123. See id. at 797, 805.
124. Id. at 800. For other similar cases, see Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436,
1443 (11th Cir. 1985) (refusing to dismiss suit against city's director of public safety based on
allegation that police officers engaged in pattern of excessive force during arrests); Voutour v.
Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 822 (1st Cir. 1985) (denying summary judgment to police chief in excessive
force case, based in part on evidence that a subordinate had informed him of three separate
incidents involving the improper use of weapons by other officers and had suggested that the
officers were not receiving adequate training), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986); Slakan v.
Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373-75 (4th Cir. 1984) (affirming jury verdict against warden, director of
prisons, and secretary of corrections, and finding sufficient evidence that they were deliberately
indifferent, based in part on seven incidents in the months preceding the incident involving the
plaintiff where prison guards had used high pressure water hoses on other prisoners who did not
pose any physical threat), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1035 (1985).
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In Manarite by Manarite v. City of Springfield,125 by contrast, the
First Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, even though it was ap-
plying the same standard of liability (deliberate indifference) at the
same stage of the proceedings (summary judgment), and the case
before it involved a greater number of prior similar incidents. In that
case, the survivors of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide in jail
by hanging himself with his shoelaces fied a Section 1983 suit against
a number of defendants, including the chief of police. In affirming the
district court's order granting summary judgment to the police chief,
the First Circuit concluded that he had not acted with deliberate indif-
ference, even though sixteen detainees had attempted suicide at the
lockup in the Springfield police station in the three years prior to the
suicide at issue in the case, four had attempted to hang themselves
with their shoelaces during the preceding nine months, and police de-
partment policy called for removing shoelaces from prisoners. 26 The
court acknowledged that the police chief was guilty of "basic short-
comings" by failing to realize the "unusual number" of suicide at-
tempts involving shoelaces and by failing to "insist that officers
implement the specific shoelace policy," and the court even admitted
that it was "tempting to say that [the police chief] should have noticed
a kind of systemic failure."'27 Nevertheless, the court reasoned:
[G]iven the large number of detailed policies implemented
by any police department and given the fact that suicide reports
likely cross a supervisor's desk one at a time, over a period of
many weeks or months and mixed with many other urgent mat-
ters, it may, in fact, prove difficult for a chief to recollect (or no-
tice) that department policies call for removal of shoelaces, along
with belts (but not shirts). 128
The court therefore concluded that the police chief might well have
been negligent, but was not deliberately indifferent.' 29
A defendant is entitled to summary judgment, as the Manarite
court noted, only when there is no genuine issue of material fact on
the question of supervisory liability, so that a reasonable jury could
not reach a verdict in the plaintiff's favor. 30 In addition, the court
must examine the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 13
At this stage of the proceedings, it seems improper for the First Cir-
cuit to have speculated-apparently, without any basis in the record
(at least, none that the court cited)-about the number of policies and
125. 957 F.2d 953 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 837 (1992).
126. See id. at 957.
127. Id. at 958.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 955. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
131. See Manarite, 957 F.2d at 955. See generally Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
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reports that crossed the police chief's desk and the interval of time
passing between the suicide reports, factors that the Fourth Circuit did
not find relevant enough even to mention in Shaw. It is not inconceiv-
able that, given the chance, the plaintiffs could have shown that the
police chief in a city the size of Springfield, Massachusetts, 32 was
guilty of more than negligence in failing to notice the pattern of sui-
cides among the limited population of detainees in the police station's
lockup. 133
Likewise, in Jojola v. Chavez,134 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of a Section 1983 claim brought by the parents of a fifteen-
year-old high school girl who had been sexually assaulted by the
school's custodian. 35  The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims
against the principal of the high school and the superintendent of the
school district even though the complaint alleged a number of prior
similar incidents: the superintendent had told the plaintiffs that there
had been problems involving the custodian prior to his attack on their
daughter; another parent had complained to the principal's predeces-
sor that the custodian had made sexual comments to female students;
rumors had circulated at the school about the custodian's sexual mis-
conduct; he had lost his job as a bus driver because of inappropriate
behavior involving a female student; he had been transferred to the
high school after unhooking the bras of female students at the junior
high school; and a parent had told the principal of the junior high that
the custodian had made a hole in the wall of the girls' locker room and
used it to spy on the girls. 136 Despite these allegations, the court con-
cluded that four incidents and other rumors over the nineteen-year
period of the custodian's employment did not constitute a sufficient
pattern to demonstrate the supervisors' knowledge of and acquies-
cence in his misconduct. 137
The supervisory defendants in Jojola prevailed at an even earlier
phase of the proceedings than the defendants in Manarite-on a mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. As the Tenth Circuit recog-
nized, a dismissal at this point is justified only if "the plaintiff can
132. In 1984, the year that the suicide at issue in Manarite took place, Springfield was the
110th largest city in the country, with a population of 152,761, and it had the 111th highest crime
rate in the country. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNI-
FORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1984, at 63-109 (1985). At that time,
however, it employed 420 full-time police officers, or 2.75 for every 1,000 residents, see id. at 268,
which gave it the 65th largest police force in the country and compared favorably with the na-
tional average of two full-time officers for each 1,000 residents. See id at 247-305, 240.
133. Cf. James E. Robertson, Fatal Custody: A Reassessment of Section 1983 Liability for
Custodial Suicide, 24 U. ToL. L. REv. 807, 807-08 & n.4 (1993) (noting that between 280 and
1,000 inmates commit suicide each year, making suicide the leading cause of death among
prisoners).
134. 55 F.3d 488 (10th Cir. 1995).
135. See id. at 490.
136. See id. at 490-91.
137. See id. at 491.
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prove no set of facts to support a claim for relief."'1 38 In addition, the
court must "accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as
true and must construe them in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiff.'1 39 It is not enough, therefore, that the court predicts the plaintiff
will ultimately lose on the merits.140 In light of this standard, it seems
premature for the court to have terminated the case at this early
stage-possibly before the plaintiffs had any opportunity to conduct
discovery141-given that expert testimony might well have established
that an adult who engages in the type of sexual behavior toward
young girls that the complaint attributed to the custodian is likely to
repeat that behavior, 142 and therefore that evidence of even four in-
stances of such egregious behavior over nineteen years is a sufficient
pattern to hold the principal and superintendent accountable. 43
138. Id. at 490. See generally Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); 5A CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357, at 325-36 (2d ed.
1990).
139. Jojola, 55 F.3d at 490 (citation omitted). See generally Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635,
636 n.3 (1980) (citing this principle in a Section 1983 case); 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
138, § 1357, at 304.
140. See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 138, § 1357, at 340; see also id. § 1357, at 321
(noting that motions to dismiss are "viewed with disfavor" and "rarely granted").
141. The court's opinion does not indicate that any discovery had taken place, and motions
to dismiss are often resolved prior to the onset of discovery. See id. § 1356, at 298-99 (distin-
guishing a motion to dismiss, which is limited to the content of the complaint, from a motion for
summary judgment, which involves consideration of the pleadings as well as the results of discov-
ery, and noting that a motion to dismiss is treated as a motion for summary judgment if the court
is considering matters outside the pleadings).
142. See KATHLEEN C. FALLER, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MANUAL
FOR DIAGNOSIS, CASE MANAGEMENT, AND TREATMENT 25, 34-35 (1988) (finding that substan-
tial percentage of those guilty of child sexual abuse assaulted more than one victim); BARBARA
E. SMITH ET AL., AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, THE PROBATION RESPONSE TO CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
OFFENDERS: How Is IT WORKING? 10, 9 (1990) (concluding that child sexual abuse offenders are
"especially likely to reoffend" because "their sexual orientation to children usually includes a
long, pervasive and active history which is extremely difficult to change"); Tracy Dell'Angela,
Sex Offenders' 'New Lives' Can Include Old Behavior, Cn. TRIB., Aug. 22, 1996, at Al. Discov-
ery might also, of course, have uncovered additional evidence of the custodian's mistreatment of
female students.
143. For other similar cases, see Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 728 (6th
Cir. 1996) (affirming order granting summary judgment to high school principal and superinten-
dent in school sexual abuse case because "simply having some incidents of harassment brought
to the attention of supervisory defendants is not sufficient to make them liable under section
1983," and there was no evidence that the supervisors had "either encouraged ... or directly
participated in" the teacher's "isolated and apparently unrelated incidents of bad behavior");
Jane Doe "A" v. Special Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 643-46 (8th Cir. 1990) (in suit filed by 11
handicapped children alleging sexual and physical abuse by school bus driver, court granted
summary judgment to five supervisors, even though each had received complaints that bus driver
had kissed a boy on the bus, and one had been told that bus driver had put his hands down a
boy's pants and pulled down a boy's pants and spanked him and had also been informed shortly
before the bus driver's arrest that he had been touching boys' crotches); Clark v. Evans, 840 F.2d
876, 884-85 (11th Cir. 1988) (granting summary judgment to Commissioner of State Department
of Corrections on the grounds that four incidents in four years where prison officials had ignored
court orders to commit mentally ill prisoners was not a sufficient pattern to put him on notice of
the need for improved training and supervision); cf Thelma D. v. Board of Educ., 934 F.2d 929,
933 (8th Cir. 1991) (granting summary judgment to Board of Education in school sexual abuse
case on the grounds that "five complaints [of sexual misconduct toward students or former stu-
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B. The Supervisor's Response to Prior Similar Incidents
The second factor on which the courts of appeals focus in evaluat-
ing a particular supervisor's liability-and closely tied to the first, the
existence of a pattern of prior similar constitutional violations-is the
nature of the supervisor's response to those earlier incidents. As a
general rule, the courts are more likely to find a supervisor liable the
less adequate the remedial steps she has taken in response to prior
violations. Whatever standard of liability the court has chosen, it is
obviously easier to conclude that a supervisor who completely ignored
a pattern of unconstitutional conduct on the part of her subordinates
ought to be accountable for the constitutional injury suffered by the
plaintiff. Once again, however, in cases with seemingly similar facts,
the courts have reached inconsistent results that do not appear to be
tied to the particular standard of liability they purport to be applying.
In Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 144 for example, a pretrial detainee
who was being held in an overcrowded jail was beaten by an inmate
who was in custody on murder charges. Applying a standard of delib-
erate indifference, the Eleventh Circuit ruled in favor of the plaintiff
and reversed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to the
sheriff. 4 5 The court noted that the sheriff admitted that he knew vio-
lence among the inmates was a regular occurrence during periods
when the jail was overcrowded. 146 Although the sheriff argued that he
could not have been deliberately indifferent because he had done
something to try to alleviate the problem-he had attempted to raise
funds to build a new jail-the court explained that a reasonable jury
could nevertheless find that he had been deliberately indifferent be-
cause he had "disregard[ed] 'alternative means' or interim measures
for reducing the risk of violence."'1 47 For example, the court observed,
the plaintiff had pointed out that the sheriff could have classified the
prisoners and segregated the violent ones, could have assigned the in-
mates to certain cells and bunks rather than letting them choose their
own quarters, could have provided training to his subordinates, and
dents] scattered over sixteen years cannot, as a matter of law, be said to comprise a persistent
and widespread pattern of unconstitutional misconduct"). But cf. Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch.
Dist., 81 F.3d 1395, 1404 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that plaintiff's allegation that unidentified
school officials had received an unspecified number of reports that unidentified staff members
were guilty of sexually abusing unidentified students was enough to justify "at least limited dis-
covery" and denial of motion to dismiss), reh'g en banc granted, No. 94-50709, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15741 (5th Cir. June 17, 1996); Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 727-
31 (3d Cir. 1989) (refusing to grant summary judgment to high school principal in sexual abuse
case where he had received five complaints about sexual assaults involving school personnel over
a span of four years, only one of which involved the employee responsible for assaulting the
-plaintiff), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990).
144. 50 F.3d 1579 (11th Cir. 1995).
145. See id. at 1580, 1582.
146. See id. at 1583.
147. Id. at 1584.
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could have better monitored the inmates by stationing the jailers so
that they could see or hear the cells. i'4
In Wilson v. City of Chicago,149 by contrast, the Seventh Circuit
ruled for the city in a Section 1983 case filed by an African American
man suspected of killing two police officers, who alleged that he had
been tortured during police interrogation. Although the complaint
was directed at the city, and not the superintendent of police, the
court explained its decision in favor of the city on the grounds that the
superintendent had not engaged in "personal deliberate wrongdoing"
and had not been deliberately or recklessly indifferent to complaints
about police brutality-a Standard virtually identical to that applied in
Hale. 5 ° The court of appeals admitted that a rational jury could have
inferred from the frequency of abuse, the number of officers involved
in torturing the plaintiff, and the number of complaints of police bru-
tality filed by the African American community that the superinten-
dent knew that the police were "prone to beat up suspected cop
killers."'' And the court conceded that the superintendent had been
"careless, maybe even grossly so," in responding to those com-
plaints. 152 But, unlike the Eleventh Circuit in Hale, the court was im-
pressed by the fact that the superintendent had taken some steps to
eliminate the practice: he had referred all complaints to the police
department office responsible for investigating charges of police mis-
conduct. Although the court acknowledged that that office "had done
nothing except lose a lot of the complaints," the ineffectual nature of
the superintendent's remedial efforts was inadequate in the court's
mind to demonstrate that he had acquiesced in the violence.' 53 "Fail-
ing to eliminate a practice cannot be equated to approving it," the
court concluded. 154
Likewise, in Busby v. City of Orlando,55 an Eleventh Circuit
opinion that predated Hale, the court affirmed an order granting a
directed verdict to a police chief even though he had apparently done
nothing to remedy problems of racial harassment and discrimination
in the police department. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that
the chief was aware that various employees at the airport where the
plaintiff worked as a security officer had complained about race dis-
crimination and also knew that officers in his employ had used racial
epithets. 56 The court also noted that the chief had failed to enact a
148. See id. at 1583-84.
149. 6 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993), modified on other grounds, Nos. 89-3747 & 90-2216, 1993
U.S. App. LEXIS 31896 (7th Cir. Dec. 8, 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1844 (1994).
150. Id. at 1240-41.




155. 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1991).
156. See id. at 782.
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written policy prohibiting the use of racial slurs,'57 and the dissent
pointed out that the chief could not remember ever disciplining an
employee for racial slurs or discrimination.5 8 Thus, the chief in
Busby-unlike the supervisory officials in Hale and Wilson-had ap-
parently failed to take any steps in response to the prior incidents.
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had
presented insufficient evidence to implicate the chief in her harass-
ment and discrimination claims.15 9
In other harassment cases, however, courts have refused to rule
in favor of supervisory officials who ignored prior complaints of
harassing behavior. For example, in Lipsett v. University of Puerto
Rico '16° the First Circuit observed that once a supervisor is notified of
a problem, "it is reasonable to infer that the failure to take [correc-
tive] steps . . . constitutes a choice 'from among various alterna-
tives. ' ' 16 1  Accordingly, the court denied summary judgment to
supervisory officials who had failed to investigate the plaintiff's
charges of gender harassment and discrimination. 62 Likewise, in Ba-
tor v. Hawaii,63 the Ninth Circuit declined to grant summary judg-
ment to a supervisor who had ignored the plaintiff's complaints of
sexual and racial harassment, reasoning that "complete inaction in the
face of claimed harassment cannot be objectively reasonable
conduct. ' '16
157. See id.
158. See id. at 788 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
159. Although the court's reasoning focuses on the question of causation, see infra notes
184-86 and accompanying text, and not on the nature of the chief's response to these prior inci-
dents or the standard of supervisory liability, the court's causation analysis is relevant here. In
noting that a supervisor can be held liable if there is a causal link between her conduct and the
violation of the plaintiff's rights, the court cited Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436,
1443 (11th Cir. 1985). See Busby, 931 F.2d at 782. Fundiller recognized the nexus between the
causation question and the supervisor's response to prior incidents, noting that the necessary
causal connection "can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible
supervisor on notice of the need for improved training or supervision, and the official fails to
take corrective action." 777 F.2d at 1443.
160. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
161. Id. at 902 (emphasis omitted).
162. See id.
163. 39 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 1994).
164. Id. at 1029. For other similar cases, see Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 837-40 (11th
Cir. 1990) (affirming denial of summary judgment to various supervisory officials who failed to
investigate or respond even though they knew prison's psychiatric staff was understaffed and
also knew of previous self-mutilations by inmate who ultimately committed suicide); Fundiller,
777 F.2d at 1443 (refusing to dismiss suit against city's director of public safety because plaintiff
alleged that the director was responsible for disciplining police officers and failed to take steps to
remedy a pattern of excessive force); Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 374 (4th Cir. 1984) (af-
firming jury verdict against warden and director of prisons and finding sufficient evidence that
they were deliberately indifferent, based in part on evidence that they had failed to implement
commission's recommendation to restrict the use of water hoses on prisoners), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1035 (1985).
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C. The Supervisor's Response to the Particular Incident in Question
The third factor that some courts of appeals consider in determin-
ing a supervisor's liability for her subordinate's constitutional wrong is
the nature of the supervisor's response to the particular incident that
led to the suit. Although some courts refuse to take this factor into
account on the grounds that the supervisor's conduct subsequent to
the constitutional violation cannot in any way have contributed to
it, 165 other courts view the supervisor's failure to respond appropri-
ately to the violation as evidence that she was deliberately indifferent
to it or acquiesced in it and therefore met whatever standard of culpa-
bility the court has chosen. 16 6 But even courts that acknowledge the
relevance of this factor use it inconsistently in determining whether a
supervisor should be held liable in a particular case.
In Hegarty v. Somerset County,167 for example, the First Circuit
granted summary judgment to the county sheriff, who had been sued
in connection with the shooting death of a suspect. The court ac-
knowledged that it was "entirely understandable" that the plaintiff
would "fault" the sheriff for refusing to discipline the officers respon-
sible for the shooting, as recommended in an investigative report is-
sued by the state attorney general's office, and for refusing to adopt
the recommendations of a citizen review board the sheriff himself had
convened to investigate the incident.168 Nevertheless, the court noted
that the sheriff had temporarily suspended the officers involved and
concluded that his conduct following the shooting was inadequate on
its own to demonstrate the deliberate indifference necessary for su-
pervisory liability in that jurisdiction. 169
In Larez v. City of Los Angeles,'170 by contrast, the Ninth Circuit
upheld a jury verdict against the chief of police in a Section 1983 case
alleging that several police officers acted in violation of the Fourth
Amendment by conducting an unreasonable search of the plaintiffs'
home and using an excessive amount of force.' 7 ' In finding the evi-
dence sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that the police chief had
acquiesced in these violations or had been reckless or callously indif-
ferent to the plaintiffs' rights-a standard no more lenient than that
applied by the First Circuit in Hegarty-the court relied exclusively on
165. See Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 95 n.11 (1st Cir. 1994) (alter-
nate holding).
166. See Hegarty v. Somerset County, 53 F.3d 1367, 1380 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
675 (1995); Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994); Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449,
1457 (6th Cir. 1990).
167. 53 F.3d 1367 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 675 (1995).
168. Id. at 1380.
169. See id. at 1380. For a similar case, see Febus-Rodriguez, 14 F.3d at 95 n.11 (concluding
that mayor's "single poorly performed investigation" of this incident "may reflect negligence,
but [not] callous or reckless indifference").
170. 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1991).
171. See id. at 646.
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the fact that the chief had not disciplined the officers involved in the
incident and had not established new procedures to avoid similar vio-
lations in the future. 1
72
Likewise, in McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 73 another case involv-
ing a police chief's responsibility for his subordinates' Fourth Amend-
ment violations, the Seventh Circuit found the evidence sufficient to
get to the jury and therefore reversed the trial court's order granting
the chief judgment notwithstanding the verdict.' 74 The court of ap-
peals observed that the police chief's failure to take any disciplinary
action in connection with the violation of the plaintiff's rights, "while
not in itself causing [the plaintiff] any injury, was evidence from which
the jury could have inferred (in combination with other evidence) that
[the police chief] was indifferent to the violation of constitutional
rights by his officers.'
'1 75
D. Causation
Given Section 1983's requirement that the defendant "subject[ ]"
the plaintiff to a violation of her constitutional rights or "cause[ ] [her]
to be [so] subjected,"' 76 and the Supreme Court's requirement in
Rizzo v. Goode of an "affirmative link" between the supervisory offi-
cial and the plaintiff's constitutional injury,' 7 causation issues often
arise in cases involving supervisory liability. A fourth factor, then,
that the courts of appeals use in determining whether a supervisor can
be held accountable for a particular constitutional deprivation is the
extent to which it can be said that the supervisor's conduct caused the
violation. The courts' discussion of this factor is often intertwined
with their discussion of one or more of the three factors described
above-most notably, the supervisor's response to prior similar inci-
dents. But because the causation issue is analytically somewhat dis-
tinct from those other factors, I address it separately here.
Most courts of appeals appear to acknowledge that the requisite
causal link can be demonstrated by proof that the supervisor failed to
respond effectively to prior similar incidents. A number of courts
have noted, for example, that causation "can be established ... by
setting in motion a series of acts by others which the [supervisor]
knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the
constitutional injury,' 1 78 and "may be supplied by [the] tort principle
172. See id. The police chief sued in Larez was Darryl Gates, who also occupied that office
at the time of the Rodney King beating. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
173. 750 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1984).
174. See it at 1391.
175. Id.
176. See supra note 5.
177. 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
178. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978); cf KEETON ET AL., supra note
34, § 44, at 303-06 (describing established tort law principles in similar fashion). For examples of
other cases using the same standard, see Tilson v. Forrest City Police Dep't, 28 F.3d 802, 806-07
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that holds a person liable for the natural consequences of his ac-
tions."'17 9 Consistent with these principles, some courts have observed
that the necessary causal link can be established by proof that the su-
pervisor failed to act in the face of a history of widespread abuse that
put her on notice of the need for corrective action.18 0 These rulings
make sense because state officials who are not disciplined for constitu-
tional wrongdoing learn that they can violate rights without suffering
any consequences, and the supervisor's failure to respond to their mis-
conduct thus "create[s] the background and climate which ... preor-
dain[ ]" the constitutional violations. 18 1
Nevertheless, a few cases seemingly reject this argument and rely
on the causation requirement as grounds for declining to impose lia-
bility on a supervisor. In most of these cases, the courts provide no
real explanation for their conclusion that the plaintiff has not satisfac-
torily proven a causal nexus, and there appears to be no principled
distinction-whether in terms of the standard of supervisory liability
or any other factor-between these cases and the majority of cases
that come to a contrary conclusion.
In Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron,'8 for example, the
First Circuit granted summary judgment to the superintendent of po-
lice in a case involving a police officer's excessive use of force, in part
because the court failed to see a causal link between the superinten-
dent's failure to discipline the officer for prior misdeeds and the con-
n.10 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting jury instructions), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995); Larez v. City
of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991); Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991); Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 397 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
179. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 67-
68 (1994); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (noting that Section 1983 "should be
read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural conse-
quences of his actions"); Nicks v. Missouri, 67 F.3d 699, 702-03 (8th Cir. 1995); cf. KEETON ET
AL., supra note 34, § 43, at 282 (describing established tort law principle to this effect). But cf.
Hegarty v. Somerset County, 53 F.3d 1367, 1380 (1st Cir.) (noting that requirement of affirma-
tive link "contemplates proof that the supervisor's conduct led inexorably to the constitutional
violation"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 675 (1995).
180. See Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933
(1991); Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Hinshaw v. Doffer, 785 F.2d
1260, 1263 (5th Cir. 1986); Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11th Cir. 1985).
181. LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1539 (11th Cir. 1993) (making this argument in the
context of suit brought against superintendent of prison by prisoners who had been assaulted
and threatened by other inmates), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1189 (1994); see also Hale v. Tallapoosa
County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1584-85 (11th Cir. 1995) (same); Shaw, 13 F.3d at 800 (refusing to grant
summary judgment and rule out proof of causation even though supervisor who had failed to
discipline police officer for prior uses of excessive force had been transferred 15 months prior to
the shooting at issue in this case); Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 730 (3d
Cir. 1989) (noting that jury could find that principal's actions of "discourag[ing] and minimiz[ing]
reports of sexual misconduct by teachers... 'encourag[ed] a climate to flourish where innocent
girls were victimized"'), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990); Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena,
882 F.2d 552, 566 (1st Cir. 1989) (observing that police superintendent's "employment of a disci-
plinary system that was grossly deficient in a number of significant areas made it highly likely
that the police officers under his command would engage in [unconstitutional] conduct").
182. 14 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 1994).
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stitutional injury inflicted on the plaintiff. The court explained, "The
inference that because [the officer] had not been sanctioned with re-
spect to ... five [prior] incidents, he believed he could get away with
anything, including assaulting [the plaintiff], is simply too tenuous.' '1 83
Similarly, in Busby v. City of Orlando,iS4 the Eleventh Circuit fo-
cused on the issue of causation in explaining its decision to affirm the
directed verdict granted to the chief of police in a racial discrimination
and harassment case. Although the court acknowledged that the chief
was aware that other employees had complained of race discrimina-
tion, and that some of his officers used racial epithets, and neverthe-
less had failed to promulgate a written policy prohibiting the use of
racial slurs, it ruled that this evidence was not even adequate to get to
the jury on the question of causation. 85 Its sole explanation for this
conclusion is as follows:
[The chief's] failure to enact such a policy, even in light of his
awareness of general complaints and the use of racial epithets,....
without more, does not constitute substantial evidence such that
reasonable minds could disagree as to whether a causal connec-
tion existed between his actions and the deprivation of [the plain-
tiff's] rights."8
In a very similar case, Andrews v. City of Philadelphia,187 by con-
trast, the Third Circuit affirmed a jury verdict against a supervisor in a
sexual harassment case, recognizing that "the jury reasonably could
have determined that [the supervisor's] failure to investigate the
source of the problem implicitly encouraged squad members to con-
tinue in their abuse" of the plaintiff."s Likewise, in Lipsett v. Univer-
sity of Puerto Rico,'89 a First Circuit opinion predating Febus-
Rodriguez, the court noted that the supervisory defendants' failure to
respond to the plaintiff's complaints of sexual harassment "discredited
[her] and sent a message to the male offenders that they could con-
tinue to drive her and other women out of the Program withimpunity. '' 1"
E. The Supervisor's Awareness of the Constitutional Misconduct
The final factor that the courts of appeals tend to consider in de-
termining a supervisor's liability for her subordinate's unconstitutional
183. ld. at 94. Although the five prior incidents were distinguishable from the excessive use
of force alleged by the plaintiffs-a point the court noted, see id. at 93-94 & n.7-the court relied
on the causation argument quoted in text as a separate ground for its decision.
184. 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1991).
185. See id. at 782. For further discussion of the facts and reasoning of Busby, see supra
notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
186. 931 F.2d at 782.
187. 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
188. Id. at 1479.
189. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
190. Id. at 907.
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behavior is the nature of the supervisor's awareness of the risk of con-
stitutional injury. The greater the supervisor's awareness of the prob-
lem, the more culpable she seems and the more likely the courts are to
conclude that their particular standard of supervisory liability is
met.19 ' Like the causation issues discussed in the preceding section,
the courts often analyze the supervisor's awareness in the context of
addressing one of the first three factors described above-typically,
the supervisor's response either to prior similar incidents or to the
incident in question.
As noted above in part I, some courts require that a supervisor
must have actually been aware of the constitutional misconduct before
she can be held liable under Section 1983, whereas other courts apply
the more lenient standard of constructive knowledge, and still others
have adopted an intermediate standard that imposes liability if the
supervisor was aware of a risk of constitutional injury."9 Regardless
of which approach they take on this issue, many courts find sufficient
evidence of knowledge if the supervisor was informed of the risk of
constitutional injury by either her subordinates 193 or the plaintiff. 94
Another common way of demonstrating the supervisor's awareness is
191. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Official Draft 1985) (creating different degrees of cul-
pability based on extent of defendant's awareness of the risk).
192. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
193. See Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 467 (3d Cir. 1992) (affirming jury
verdict and finding sufficient evidence of supervisor's actual knowledge where subordinate ad-
vised supervisor of plaintiff's complaints of gender discrimination); Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d
829, 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1990) (refusing to grant summary judgment and concluding that jury
could infer that a reasonable person would have been aware of risk where prison psychiatrist
told supervisors about inadequate staffing); cf Bailey v. Wood, 909 F.2d 1197, 1199-1200 (8th
Cir. 1990) (on appeal from jury verdict in plaintiff's favor, court assumes evidence was sufficient
to show that warden knew plaintiff was at risk from other inmate, because he had received
reports from his staff regarding that inmate).
194. See, e.g., Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995) (refusing to grant sum-
mary judgment to superintendent because one reasonable construction of prisoner's allegations
was that superintendent was aware that prisoner had been denied access to legal materials by
virtue of the letters prisoner had written him); Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 502 (2d Cir. 1994)
(reversing grant of summary judgment to superintendent, who had been served with plaintiffs
habeas corpus petition and thus was on notice that plaintiff had been confined without meaning-
ful hearing); Keenan, 983 F.2d at 467 (affirming jury verdict and finding sufficient evidence of
supervisor's actual knowledge where plaintiff met with supervisor and informed him of
subordinate's discriminatory treatment); Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir.
1990) (denying summary judgment to warden and director of Department of Corrections, who
had personal knowledge of prison conditions because they had reviewed grievances filed by
plaintiffs); Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 138 (8th Cir. 1989) (affirming denial of judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and concluding that rational jury could have found that supervisory
official knew or should have known of cell conditions, where plaintiff had repeatedly complained
to him); Thomas v. Booker, 784 F.2d 299, 301-02 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (affirming jury verdict and
finding sufficient evidence that supervisory prison official knew or should have known of danger
to prisoner where prisoner had told him of fears for his safety), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1117
(1986); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that "[r]eceipt of letters by
prison officials may be evidence of personal knowledge of unconstitutional conditions" at
prison).
No. 1]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
by presenting evidence that the mistreatment was so pervasive, 95 or
the prior history of abuse so widespread, 196 that the supervisor must
have been aware of it.197 In addition, a number of courts of appeals
have inferred from the presence of news reports publicizing the con-
stitutional misconduct that the supervisor must have been aware of
the problem. 198 Some courts have also relied on statements made by
other state officials-typically, those who work for the supervisor-
indicating their recognition of the problem as evidence that the super-
visor must likewise have been aware. 19 9 And finally, some courts have
reasoned that the supervisor must have been aware of the problem
based on rumors circulating in the workplace. °°
Nevertheless, some courts have ruled in favor of supervisors on
the ground that they were unaware of the problem, even though the
plaintiffs presented proof along the lines described above that pre-
sumably would have satisfied other courts. In Jojola v. Chavez,2°' for
195. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1479 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming
jury verdict and finding sufficient evidence of actual knowledge where the use of abusive lan-
guage and display of pornographic photos were "so offensive and regular that they could not
have gone unnoticed" by supervisors); cf. Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1240 (7th Cir.
1993) (noting, in context of suit against city, that rational jury could infer that superintendent of
police knew of misbehavior by police officers, based in part on the number of officers involved in
the violation in question), modified on other grounds, Nos. 89-3747 & 90-2216, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 31896 (7th Cir. Dec. 8, 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1844 (1994).
196. See, e.g., Hinshaw v. Doffer, 785 F.2d 1260, 1263 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming jury verdict
for plaintiff and noting that " 'knowledge may be imputed'" to a supervisor based on a "history
of widespread abuse"); Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 375 (4th Cir. 1984) (affirming verdict in
plaintiff's favor and observing that "the prevalence of the practice" is "a circumstantial indica-
tion" that the supervisor was aware of it), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1035 (1985); cf. Wilson, 6 F.3d at
1240 (making this argument in connection with suit against city).
197. These cases are not necessarily applying a standard of constructive knowledge-inquir-
ing what the supervisor should have known-but are instead inferring that the supervisor must
have actually known about the problem. See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1981
(1994) (noting that "a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk
from the very fact that the risk was obvious") (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTiN W. Sco-r,
JR., SUBSTANInVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.7(d), at 335 (1986)).
198. See Meriwether v. Coughlin, 879 F.2d 1037, 1048 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming jury verdict
and finding sufficient evidence that supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge); Slakan,
737 F.2d at 375 (applying standard requiring deliberate indifference, tacit authorization, or ac-
quiescence and affirming jury verdict); McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693, 697 (10th Cir. 1979)
(applying standard requiring actual or constructive knowledge and reversing grant of summary
judgment to two supervisory officials).
199. See Meriwether, 879 F.2d at 1048 (applying standard of actual or constructive knowl-
edge and affirming jury verdict where supervisor's press secretary had issued statement to the
press); Slakan, 737 F.2d at 375 (affirming jury verdict and observing that secretary of Depart-
ment of Corrections "must have been aware of the commission report recommending tighter
controls on the use of water hoses" in prison); cf. Angarita v. St. Louis County, 981 F.2d 1537,
1545 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming jury verdict and concluding that jury could reasonably infer that
police superintendent knew that his subordinates had coerced the plaintiffs to resign from their
jobs, in part because the subordinates told the plaintiffs during interrogation that the superinten-
dent would not allow them to leave with their jobs).
200. See, e.g., Meriwether, 879 F.2d at 1048 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying standard of actual or
constructive knowledge and affirming jury verdict).
201. 55 F.3d 488 (10th Cir. 1995). The facts and reasoning of this case are also discussed
supra at notes 134-43.
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example, the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a Section 1983 claim
filed against the supervisors of a high school custodian who allegedly
assaulted the plaintiffs' daughter. The court concluded that the plain-
tiffs had not shown that the supervisory officials-the high school
principal and the superintendent of the school district-had either ac-
tual or constructive knowledge of the custodian's sexual contact with
students, even though the complaint alleged that the principal of the
junior high school and the previous high school principal had received
complaints about the custodian, that rumors had circulated at the
school regarding his behavior, and that the custodian had lost his job
as a school bus driver and had been transferred from the junior high
to the high school because of his mistreatment of female students.2 °2
In fact, the court even dismissed the plaintiffs' allegation that the su-
perintendent had made a statement to them admitting that "problems
involving [the custodian] had arisen prior to the attack" on their
daughter as only "one nonspecific statement. 20
3
Likewise, in Rode v. Dellarciprete,2° the Third Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of the governor and state attorney general from a suit
claiming that the plaintiff had been suspended from her job with the
state police in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights.
The plaintiff's complaint alleged that numerous newspaper articles
had appeared throughout the state publicizing the retaliatory harass-
ment of herself and a coworker, that a resolution had been introduced
in the state legislature calling for an investigation of retaliatory meas-
ures taken against employees of the state police, that grievances and
complaints had been filed with the governor and lieutenant governor,
and that she herself had filed a grievance with the governor.20 5 In
addition, the court of appeals observed that the state police had been
involved in what the court termed a "protracted history of litigation
... charging it with racial animus in its employment practices," and
that the state legislature had held hearings on the problem of racial
discrimination by the state police.20 6 Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff had "fail[ed] to allege knowledge and acquies-
cence with the required particularity. '207 Although the court rightly
noted that Pennsylvania is "a large state employing many thousands
of employees," it was wrong to go on to suggest that giving the plain-
tiff an opportunity to substantiate her allegations "would subject the
Governor to potential liability in any case in which an aggrieved em-
ployee merely transmitted a complaint" to the office of the governor
202. See 55 F.3d at 490-91.
203. Id. at 491.
204. 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988).
205. See id. at 1208.
206. Id. at 1201-02.
207. Id. at 1208.
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or lieutenant governor.20 8 The plaintiff's complaint cited much more
than the filing of a single grievance as evidence of the governor's
knowledge of the problem, and it might well have been, as courts have
found in other cases, that the number of complaints alleging discrimi-
nation by the state police or the amount of attention given to the issue
suggested that "the prevalence of the practice was itself a circumstan-
tial indication that administrators at all levels knew and approved" of
it.20
9
IV. MAKING SENSE OF SUPERVISORY LIABILITY
As is apparent from the description of the case law in parts I and
III, the federal courts of appeals have not reached a consensus on the
extent to which supervisors are to be held accountable for the consti-
tutional wrongdoing of their subordinates. The courts have adopted
different standards of liability, and, in implementing those standards,
they have inconsistently applied the factors relevant in determining a
supervisor's liability on the facts of a given case. As a result of this
confusion, cases with similar facts have been decided differently by
different courts, and sometimes even by different panels in the same
circuit.
Supervisory liability is an issue that ought to be resolved uni-
formly throughout the country. Unlike certain procedural issues that
arise in Section 1983 cases and are not treated identically in every
jurisdiction,21 ° the nature of supervisory liability is a substantive ques-
tion that calls for a uniform rule.21' As the courts of appeals have
recognized in rejecting state law as a source for the standard of super-
visory liability,212 there ought to be a national standard governing the
extent to which a supervisory state official can be held responsible for
208. Id.
209. Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 375 (4th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1035 (1985).
210. Relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (1994), which instructs courts in Section 1983 cases to
apply "the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the [forum]
State," in cases where federal law is "deficient," the Supreme Court has held that statute of
limitations and survival issues that arise in Section 1983 cases are to be governed by state rules
and may therefore vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261
(1985) (length of limitations period); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980) (tolling
of limitations period); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) (survival of actions).
211. Cf. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 152 (1988) (characterizing state's notice-of-claim re-
quirement as "more than a mere rule of procedure," but instead "a substantive condition on the
right to sue governmental officials and entities," and therefore refusing to apply it in Section
1983 cases); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1985) (noting that Congress "did not intend
to assign to state courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of defining
and characterizing the essential elements of a federal cause of action" and citing "the federal
interest in uniformity," the Court holds that characterization of Section 1983 claims for statute of
limitations purposes is a question of federal law); Kreimer, supra note 45, at 615 (observing that
the Supreme Court has resolved issues relating to damages and immunities in Section 1983 cases
"without even a passing reference to the state rules to which section 1988 is thought to direct
attention" and, as a result, "a substantial degree of national uniformity increasingly prevails").
212. See supra note 26.
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constitutional wrongs-just as there is for lower-level public officials
and municipalities. The nature of a plaintiff's constitutional rights
should not vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and neither should
the constitutional duty of supervisory officials.
In addition to being uniform, the standard of supervisory liability
ought to be a meaningful one. As the Court recognized in Monell v.
Department of Social Services, Congress intended that Section 1983 be
"broadly construed" so as to "give a broad remedy for violations of
federally protected civil rights." '213 The statute's twin goals of com-
pensating the victims of constitutional wrongs and deterring constitu-
tional violations214 are undermined when the only defendant
realistically subject to suit is the subordinate state official directly re-
sponsible for violating the plaintiff's rights. Rather, Section 1983
plaintiffs need an effective remedy against the governmental body that
employed the state official and/or the official who supervised her.
High-ranking supervisors and employers are the ones who have the
power and resources to take the steps necessary to avoid future viola-
tions. Deterrence of wrongdoing is therefore maximized when they
are exposed to liability and thus have an incentive to implement the
necessary reforms.215
Recognizing the importance of providing a meaningful remedy
against someone other than a low-level employee, other areas of the
law accord those who are wronged by an employee a ready cause of
action against either the employer or the supervisor. For example, in
213. 436 U.S. 658, 686, 685 (1978); see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) ("As
remedial legislation, Section 1983 is to be construed generously to further its primary purpose.").
214. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981); Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
215. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT- CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS XVii-Xviii (1983) (noting that "[high-level supervisory or policymaking officials tend to
be more visible, financially capable of satisfying a judgment, and well positioned to change offi-
cial policy"); see also MICHAEL AVERY & DAVID RUDOVSKY, POLICE MISCONDUcT: LAW AND
LITIGATION § 3.4, at 3-22 (2d ed. 1995); cf United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 668-69, 671-72
(1975) (citing similar policies in support of decision to hold high-level corporate officials crimi-
nally liable for violations of food and drug laws).
If the state has a practice of indemnifying public officials for damages assessed against them
in Section 1983 cases, see generally SCHUCK, supra, at 85-87, a prevailing plaintiff should, in
theory, receive full compensation by suing the subordinate state official who violated her rights.
Nevertheless, creating a meaningful remedy against supervisors is important to fully realize Sec-
tion 1983's compensatory purpose for several reasons. First, the state's indemnification policy
may be limited, and the state may be more likely to indemnify a higher ranking official. See id.;
AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra, at 3-22. Second, subordinate state officials may be more successful
in raising the qualified immunity defense. See infra notes 251-52 and accompanying text. Fi-
nally, juries may be more sympathetic to lower-level. officials and thus less inclined to return
verdicts against them. See Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Under-
mining Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 548-49 (1993); Jon 0. Newman,
Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law En-
forcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 456 (1978) (noting that jurors are often unaware of the
state's indemnification policies and therefore "understandably succumb[ ] easily to the argu-
ment, stated or implied, that recovery should be denied because the damages must come from
the paycheck of a hard-working, underpaid police officer").
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employment discrimination cases brought under Title VII,21 6 employ-
ers-including state and local governments 217 -are routinely held
strictly liable for the actions of their employees.218 Ironically, the cur-
rent debate in the Title VII arena is whether liability should also be
extended to the individual employees responsible for those discrimi-
natory acts.219
Under the law of torts-a body of law that the Supreme Court
often looks to in fashioning the rules governing Section 1983
cases EE-0 an employer is liable for any tort committed by an employee
acting within the scope of her employment.22' Strict liability is consid-
ered appropriate in such cases because "the idea of responsibility for
the harm done by the servant's activities follow[s] naturally" from the
employer's ability to "exercise control over the physical activities of
the servant," and because "it would be unjust to permit an employer
to gain from the intelligent cooperation of others without being re-
sponsible for the mistakes, the errors of judgment and the frailties of
those working under his direction and for his benefit. '2 22 Even when
the employee acts outside the scope of her employment, the employer
is still liable under certain circumstances, including whenever the em-
ployer is negligent or reckless.223
216. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
217. See MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 5.09 (1988).
218. The lone exception comes in hostile environment sexual harassment cases, where the
Supreme Court has rejected strict vicarious liability for employers. See Maria M. Carillo, Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor Under Title VII: Reassessment of Employer
Liability in Light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 75 (1992-
1993) (citing Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)). Although the courts apply
various standards of liability in these harassment cases, see Rachel E. Lutner, Note, Employer
Liability for Sexual Harassment: The Morass of Agency Principles and Respondeat Superior,
1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 589, 598-602, plaintiffs can generally recover from employers that had
actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.
See 1 MARK A. ROTHSTEn ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 490-91 (1994).
219. See Scott B. Goldberg, Comment, Discrimination by Managers and Supervisors: Rec-
ognizing Agent Liability Under Title VII, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 571, 573-74 (1994) (citing conflict-
ing cases).
220. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-78 (1985) (holding that state statute of limita-
tions periods for personal injury tort suits are to be applied in Section 1983 cases); Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 38-48 (1983) (adopting tort punitive damages rules for Section 1983 cases);
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978) (using tort damages principles as "the appropriate
starting point for the inquiry under § 1983"); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (observ-
ing that Section 1983 "should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man
responsible for the natural consequences of his actions"). See generally Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (referring to a Section 1983 violation as a "constitutional
tort"); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976) (noting that Section 1983 "creates a species
of tort liability"); Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to
Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719 (1989) (describing the Supreme Court's shift away from "constitutional
rhetoric" and toward "tort rhetoric" in its Section 1983 opinions).
221. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958). Although the corporation is
responsible for the torts of its employees, the corporate officers are usually not liable unless they
participated personally in the tortious conduct. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER,
LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 609 n.5 (3d ed. 1983).
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) cmt. a (1958).
223. See id. § 219(2)(b).
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Based on similar policy considerations,224 the law of contracts
provides that an agent's acts-although unauthorized-nevertheless
bind the principal and can subject the principal to liability so long as
the agent was acting with apparent authority.22 5 Even in the absence
of apparent authority, the unauthorized acts of a general agent-
which presumably would include any full-time employee 22 6 -bind the
principal so long as they are incidental to, or typically a part of, the
tasks the agent is authorized to perform.22 7  Imposing liability on the
principal for "the mistakes or overzealousness" of its agents is consid-
ered appropriate in order to "stimulate[ ] the watchfulness of the em-
ployer in selecting and supervising ... [its] agents. 221
In the area of securities law, any "controlling person" is jointly
and severally liable for the acts of those within her control.22 9
Although strict vicarious liability is not imposed in such cases, the
controlling person has a defense only if she "maintained and enforced
a reasonable and proper system of supervision and internal con-
trol"23 -and she has the burden of proving that defense.23'
Thus, the law governing Section 1983 is somewhat aberrational in
that it has created barriers making it difficult to sue both public em-
ployers and supervisory officials.2 32 Nothing in the language or legis-
224. See id. § 161 cmt. a.
225. See id. § 159.
226. See id. § 161 cmt. a (defining a "special agent" as one who is "employed only to con-
duct individually distinct transactions" and who is not, therefore, "in any sense a part of the
business organization of the principal").
227. See id. § 161.
228. WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 58 (1964).
229. See THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURmES REGULATION 368 (3d ed. 1996). The
Securities and Exchange Commission's definition of "control"-"the possession, direct or indi-
rect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person,
whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise," 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.405 (1996)-presumably includes any policy-making officer. See HAZEN, supra, at 253; see
also Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 881 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
question whether the defendant was a "controlling person" depends on whether she "exercised
control over[ ] the operations of the [controlled] person in general .... possessed the power or
ability to control the specific transaction or activity upon which the primary violation was predi-
cated, [and] whether or not that power was exercised"), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 904 (1993).
230. Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1576 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980). See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994) (imposing liability on a controlling person unless she "acted in good faith
and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of
action"); Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994) (imposing liability on a controlling
person unless she lacked any "knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of
the facts" on which her liability is allegedly based).
231. See HAZEN, supra note 229, at 368. The "lack of knowledge" defense available to con-
trolling persons "relate[s] to the basic facts underlying the course of business" and therefore
does not automatically provide a defense simply because the defendant "lack[s] knowledge of
the particular transaction." Id.
232. See Laura Oren, Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should
Pay?, 50 U. Prr-r. L. REV. 935 (1989) (criticizing the Supreme Court for developing the law
governing individual immunities and municipal liability in isolation, without acknowledging the
cumulative effect of each set of cases on the scope of Section 1983); cf Mark R. Brown, Correlat-
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lative history of Section 1983 justifies this anomaly,233 and it
undermines the statute's compensatory and deterrent aims.
One obvious solution to this anomaly is to change the rules gov-
erning the liability of employers in Section 1983 cases and to make
governmental entities vicariously liable for the constitutional mis-
deeds of their employees. This approach would require the Court (or
Congress) to overrule-or the lower courts to ignore-Monell's offi-
cial policy and custom requirement for municipal liability as well as
the Court's holdings that states are not subject to suit under Section
1983.2 Although these rulings have not escaped criticism, 235 the
Court does not seem inclined to depart from them. Therefore, the
alternative tack is to create a standard of supervisory liability that pro-
vides a meaningful remedy to those whose rights were violated as well
as a meaningful deterrent to future constitutional violations.
In light of the Court's unwillingness to subject cities to respon-
deat superior liability,236 the fact that the one statement the Court has
made about supervisory liability rejected vicarious liability in that con-
text as well, 237 and the causation requirement expressly contained in
Section 1983,23 it seems unlikely that the Court will be willing to en-
dorse vicarious liability for supervisors. But any standard requiring
culpability on the part of the supervisor, including negligence, is faith-
ful to the Court's precedents and the causation requirement. As dis-
cussed above, a supervisor who is negligent-who fails to exercise
reasonable care in training, supervising, or disciplining her subordi-
nates-is responsible in some causative sense for their constitutional
misdeeds,239 and requiring proof of personal fault would assuage the
Court's concerns about strict liability.21°
ing Municipal Liability and Official Immunity Under Section 1983, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 625, 679-
83 (advocating an inverse relationship between individual and municipal liability, so that the
individual municipal employee is liable if the city is not, and vice versa); Kramer & Sykes, supra
note 86, at 272-300 (suggesting a symmetrical approach to individual and municipal liability, such
that a city is held liable either vicariously or on a showing of negligence for its employees' bad
faith acts, but shares its employees' immunity for good faith acts).
233. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
234. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (holding that a state is
not a "person" suable under Section 1983); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (holding that
Section 1983 was not intended to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity).
235. For commentary critical of Monell's rejection of strict liability for cities, see SCHIJCK,
supra note 215, at 120; Hoffman, supra note 10, at 1518; Schuck, supra note 103; see also supra
note 86. For commentary critical of Quern, see Bruce McBirney, Note, Quern v. Jordan: A
Misdirected Bar to Section 1983 Suits Against States, 67 CAL. L. REV. 407 (1979). For commen-
tary critical of Will, see Ann Althouse, Tapping the State Court Resource, 44 VAND. L. REV. 953,
972-73 (1991); Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to
Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REv. 51, 99-100 (1989); Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 45, at 827.
236. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
237. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 US. 362, 371 (1976); see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 5.
239. See supra notes 103 and 181 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text,
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Moreover, a negligence standard best serves Section 1983's com-
pensatory and deterrent purposes. On the most basic level, negli-
gence is, of course, a lesser standard of culpability than the various
standards currently in effect in the federal courts and therefore more
likely to lead to a verdict favorable to those who have suffered consti-
tutional injury. But in addition, by imposing liability in any case
where the supervisor acted unreasonably and was therefore culpable,
a negligence standard may avoid some of the difficult line-drawing
that is involved in applying the current standards of liability and that
may account for the inconsistencies in the case law. Simple negli-
gence, gross negligence, reckless and deliberate indifference, and
knowledge and acquiescence are all points on the continuum of culpa-
bility, and the lines that separate them are relatively fine.241 Imposing
supervisory liability on proof of negligence not only relieves the courts
of the onerous task of drawing those distinctions, but also precludes
the courts from concluding-based on little more than ipse dixit-that
a culpable supervisor was negligent, or possibly even grossly negligent,
but did not meet the higher standard of reckless or deliberate indiffer-
ence, or knowledge and acquiescence, in place in that jurisdiction.242
Any countervailing policy considerations are adequately served
by rejecting strict liability and affording supervisors a qualified immu-
nity defense. For example, some courts and commentators have
pointed out that supervisory officials working in the public sector
often do not have the same ability to hire and fire subordinates en-
joyed by their counterparts in the private sphere,243 and therefore it
may seem unfair to hold public sector supervisors accountable for the
constitutional transgressions of their subordinates. But given the pro-
tections already afforded by the qualified immunity defense, this con-
cern for fairness does not require that the courts erect a standard of
supervisory liability higher than negligence. 2 "
241. See supra note 34.
242. For examples of such cases, see Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 93,
94, 95 n.11 (1st Cir. 1994); Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1240 (7th Cir. 1993), modified
on other grounds, Nos. 89-3747 & 90-2216, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31896 (7th Cir. Dec. 8, 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1844 (1994); Gates v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 449, 996 F.2d 1035, 1043 (10th
Cir. 1993); Bowen v. City of Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, 21 (1st Cir. 1992); Manarite by Manarite v:
City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 958 (1st Cir. 1992); Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th
Cir. 1992); Jane Doe "A" v. Special Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 646, 647 (8th Cir. 1990).
243. See, e.g., 1 NAHMOD, supra note 23, at 239; Brown, supra note 25, at 118 (citing cases).
But cf Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1131-32 (1980)
(questioning the distinction between public and private managers).
244. For a response to the argument that supervisors should not be held to a higher standard
than their subordinates, see Brown, supra note 25, at 114-19.
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As noted above, the defense of qualified immunity already
shields executive branch 245 officials from damages246 liability unless
the constitutional rights asserted by the plaintiff were "clearly estab-
lished ... rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 247
The Supreme Court created the qualified immunity defense in order
to protect public officials from being sued for every error in judgment,
thereby diverting their attention from their public responsibilities and
impeding the independent exercise of their discretion.24 The defense
has been structured so as to accommodate the conflicting policies of
remedying and deterring constitutional violations while at the same
time protecting public officials,249 and that defense ought to provide a
sufficient shield for supervisory officials as well.250
As I have argued elsewhere, the qualified immunity inquiry ought
to focus on whether a reasonable public official in the defendant's po-
sition would have realized that the plaintiff's constitutional rights were
being violated.25' That question might not be resolved in the same
way for a subordinate and a supervisory official: what these two offi-
cials can reasonably be expected to know about the plaintiff's consti-
tutional rights might differ if, for example, they do not have the same
access to legal advice, their actions and decisions are subject to differ-
245. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). Although the qualified immunity
defense is available only to executive branch officials, other state officials-judges, prosecutors,
and legislators-enjoy the even broader defense of absolute immunity, which protects them
from liability so long as they were acting within the bounds of the protected function. See Stump
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecu-
tors); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators).
246. The individual immunity defenses available in Section 1983 suits are normally inappli-
cable in suits seeking only declaratory or injunctive relief. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522,
528-42 (1984) (refusing to extend absolute judicial immunity to such suits); Harlow, 457 U.S. at
819 n.34 (limiting its holding, which modified the qualified immunity defense, to damages cases).
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on the availability of the qualified immu-
nity defense in injunctive suits, see id., the courts of appeals have generally refused to recognize
the defense in such cases. See Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The
Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REv. 597, 600 n.13 (1989) (collecting cases).
Despite the unavailability of the qualified immunity defense, the Supreme Court has er-
ected a number of other barriers to injunctive relief that serve the federalism and other interests
underlying qualified immunity. See supra note 16. Perhaps as a result of these barriers, most
Section 1983 suits filed against individual defendants seek damages rather than injunctive relief.
See Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 45, at 759 n.18; cf. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561,
575 (1986) (observing that "injunctive relief generally is unavailable ... in the area of individual
police misconduct").
247. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
248. See id. at 807, 813-14; Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975). In fact, the
Court in Harlow expanded the scope of the defense so as to protect public officials from "broad-
ranging discovery" that the Court considered "peculiarly disruptive of effective government," to
"avoid excessive disruption of government," and to "permit the resolution of many insubstantial
claims on summary judgment." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18.
249. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807, 813-14.
250. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (noting that qualified immunity "pro-
vides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law").
251. See Kinports, supra note 246, at 618-34.
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252ent constraints, or they are acting under different time pressures.
If, given these factors, the law was such that a reasonable public offi-
cial in the supervisor's position would not have known that her
subordinate's conduct violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights, then
the supervisor should be protected by the qualified immunity
defense. 3
Under the negligence standard of culpability advocated in this ar-
ticle-when combined with Section 1983's causation requirement and
the qualified immunity defense-a supervisor would be accountable
for her subordinate's constitutional wrongdoing only if three condi-
tions were met. First, she must have been negligent: she must have
failed to act reasonably in supervising, training, or disciplining the
subordinate. Second, the plaintiff's constitutional injury must have
been a foreseeable result of her negligence, so that her negligence can
be deemed a legal cause of the violation. And finally, she must not be
entitled to qualified immunity, that is, the law must be clear enough
that she could reasonably have been expected to realize that her
subordinate's actions were unconstitutional. Imposing liability in
252. See id. at 622-30.
253. It makes little sense to say, as some courts do, that a supervisor should be entitled to
qualified immunity unless a reasonable public official in her position would have realized that
her own conduct violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Dolihite v. Maughon, 74
F.3d 1027, 1054 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 185 (1996); Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d
829, 836 (11th Cir. 1990); Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726, 730 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990). The cases that are the focus of this article are those
where the supervisor did not herself violate the plaintiff's rights-or order, authorize, or other-
wise participate directly in the violation-but where it was her subordinate who did so. Assum-
ing that a reasonable public official in the supervisor's position would have realized that her
subordinate's conduct infringed the plaintiff's rights, and assuming, in addition, that the standard
of supervisory liability in effect in the particular jurisdiction is met, then, by definition, a reason-
able supervisor would have known that her own conduct would "cause[ ] [the plaintiff] to be
subjected" to a constitutional injury within the meaning of Section 1983. Therefore, the supervi-
sor can fairly be subjected to liability without undermining any of the policy reasons underlying
the qualified immunity defense.
Likewise, it is wrong for the courts to say, as some currently do, that a supervisor is entitled
to qualified immunity if the standard of supervisory liability was not clearly established at the
time of the constitutional violation or if it was not clearly established that the supervisor failed to
meet that standard. See Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1544 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that supervi-
sor is entitled to immunity unless a reasonable person in her position would understand that her
shortcomings constituted deliberate indifference); Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1398
(11th Cir. 1994) (granting police chief qualified immunity because "no decisions ... clearly es-
tablish that [his] failure to train his officers amounted to deliberate indifference"); Doe v. Taylor
Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454-56 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (stating that supervisors are entitled to
immunity if their duty not to be deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's rights was not clearly
established), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994); Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 730 (noting that it was
clearly established that a supervisor could not condone or authorize unconstitutional conduct).
These formulations of the qualified immunity standard confuse the immunity defense with the
standard of supervisory liability; it is the plaintiff's constitutional rights that must be clearly es-
tablished, not the supervisor's deliberate indifference or the law governing the standard of super-
visory liability. See Lipsett v. University of P.R., 759 F. Supp. 40, 56 & n.15 (D.P.R. 1991). Proof
that satisfies whatever standard of supervisory liability the court has chosen-when combined
with proof that the plaintiffs rights were clearly established at the time of the violation, so as to
defeat the qualified immunity defense-ought to be a sufficient basis on which to hold the super-
visor accountable for the violation.
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cases where these three conditions are met affords supervisory offi-
cials adequate protection and avoids chilling legitimate official activ-
ity, while at the same time serving Section 1983's goals of
compensating the victims of constitutional violations and deterring
constitutional misconduct.
V. CONCLUSION
The beating of Rodney King has been called "'the defining inci-
dent in police brutality.' "254 Unfortunately, there has not yet been a
comparable defining moment for the law governing a supervisor's re-
sponsibility for her subordinate's constitutional wrongdoing.
Although the question of supervisory liability came to the fore at the
time of the King beating, and continues to arise frequently in Section
1983 litigation, it has received little attention from either Congress or
the Supreme Court. The only guidance on this issue that can reason-
ably be gleaned from the language of Section 1983, its legislative his-
tory, and the relevant Supreme Court precedents is that supervisory
officials should not be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior.
Beyond that, the lower federal courts have been left largely on their
own to devise a standard of supervisory liability for Section 1983
cases. In so doing, the courts of appeals have not spoken with one
voice, either in articulating the applicable standard or in implementing
the various standards they have chosen.
The inconsistencies that plague this area of the law ought to be
reconciled so as to provide a uniform standard of supervisory liability,
as well as guidance to the public officials who are bound by that stan-
dard. Towards that end, this article recommends that supervisors be
held to a negligence standard. Given the protections already afforded
public officials by the qualified immunity defense, a negligence test
best accommodates the relevant competing goals: on the one hand,
providing a meaningful remedy to those whose constitutional rights
have been violated and a meaningful deterrent to constitutional mis-
conduct, and, on the other hand, shielding blameless public officials
from liability and protecting state and local governments from unnec-
essary intrusions by the federal judiciary.
254. Mydans et al., supra note 1, at Al (quoting Jerome Skolnick, professor of law and
sociology).
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